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Sadabad Pact

Signature Date

8 July 1937

Place of Signature

Sadabad Palace (Tehran, Iran)

Date of Entry into Force

25 June 1938

TBMM Approval Date

14 January 1938

Founding/Participating States

Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan

Total Population Affected Area

~60 Million

Basic Nature

Regional friendship, consultation and non-aggression pact

Main Objectives of the Pact

Collectively ensuring border security

Strengthening regional cooperation

Commitment to the principles of the League of Nations

Actual Reason/Year of Termination

In 1941, Iran, one of the member states, was militarily occupied by Britain and the Soviet Union

Sadabad Pact, signed on 7 July 1937 at the Sadabad Palace in Tehran, the capital of Iran, is a regional agreement on friendship, security and non-aggression between Türkiye, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan.【1】


In nature, it is not a military defense alliance or a common military bloc but a political treaty in which the parties commit to mutually safeguarding border security, refraining from interference in each other’s internal affairs, consulting on matters of common interest and pledging non-aggression against each other. The pact holds the distinction of being the first regional security and cooperation organization established by Middle Eastern states independently of external powers, acting on their own initiative in modern Middle Eastern history.

Historical Background and the Path to the Pact

The process leading to the Sadabad Pact was shaped by the instability in the international system and shifting power balances during the interwar period. From the mid-1930s onward, the revisionist and expansionist policies of Germany and Italy aimed at altering the existing international order accelerated regional security concerns. In particular, Italian leader Mussolini’s declaration on 19 March 1934 at the Fascist Congress that Italy’s historical interests lay in Asia and Africa generated security anxieties among Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries.【2】 Italy’s military preparations on islands in the Aegean Sea and its invasion of Ethiopia on 3 October 1935 pushed regional states toward forming a collective peace and security circle.【3】 Simultaneously, Germany’s rapid rearmament and its deployment of troops into the Rhineland in 1936, along with its policies toward Austria and Czechoslovakia, heightened the risk of global war.【4】 In response to these military maneuvers, Britain began diplomatically supporting behind the scenes the idea of regional states forming a pact to preserve the status quo in the Middle East and contain Italian and German influence.【5】 Moreover, during the 1930s the Middle East became a competitive arena between the Soviet Union and Britain, prompting regional states wary of great power intervention to seek a common ground.

Internal Political Structures and Motivations of the Founding States

Türkiye’s Security and Regional Approach

In the second half of the 1930s, Türkiye possessed a stable domestic political structure and established regime legitimacy following its national liberation struggle. With the political confidence this brought, Türkiye pursued an active, peaceful and initiative-driven foreign policy in accordance with the principle “Peace at Home, Peace in the World.”

Türkiye’s reasons for joining the pact and its regional approach were based on the following principles:

  • Border Security and Defense Perimeter: Having secured its western borders through the 1934 Balkan Entente, Türkiye aimed to establish a complete security ring around its borders by creating a similar collective security mechanism with its eastern neighbors.
  • Regional Mediation and Cooperation: Having resolved bilateral issues with neighboring states and established a position of trust, Türkiye sought to ensure regional stability by assuming technical and legal mediation roles in the border disputes among Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan.
  • Model Building and Prestige: Recognized by contemporary Middle Eastern states as a model due to its administrative, economic and social development initiatives, Türkiye aimed through this pact to promote fundamental values such as peaceful conflict resolution and coexistence across the region, while enhancing its international prestige and influence.

Iraq’s Domestic Political Balances and Foreign Policy Aspirations

Iraq’s path to joining the pact was shaped by the limited independence conditions imposed by the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and internal military-political developments. Although the League of Nations mandate formally ended in 1932, Britain’s continued presence of military bases in Iraq and its requirement for consultation on foreign policy stirred nationalist opposition within the country.

Iraq’s internal political structure and foreign policy aspirations were grounded in the following considerations:

  • Legitimacy and Balance Seeking: The government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Said and King Faisal pursued a strategy of developing diplomatic relations with Türkiye and Iran to appease rising nationalist opposition to the restricted independence protocols and to enhance their prestige vis-à-vis Britain.
  • Pan-Arab and Regional Discourse Dilemma: A conflict emerged within Iraqi domestic politics between the Pan-Arab discourse, led by the Hashemite dynasty and aiming to establish an Arab unity, and the local nationalist discourse focused on socio-economic development and good relations with neighbors.【6】 The “Arab Entente” established in 1936 between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen was a manifestation of these Pan-Arab tendencies.
  • 1936 Military Coup and Shift in Orientation: In October 1936, a military coup led by Bakir Sıtkı and Hikmet Süleyman overthrew the government aligned with the Pan-Arab line.【7】 The new nationalist government under Hikmet Süleyman prioritized good relations with neighboring countries and adopted Türkiye and Iran’s modernization models as benchmarks, becoming one of the founding members of the pact accordingly.
  • Border Security: The Iraqi administration sought through this alliance to secure its northern and eastern borders, control tribal movements in border regions and mitigate perceptions of external threats.

Iran’s Independent Foreign Policy and Development Goals

Iran’s path to joining the pact occurred under the rule of Reza Shah, who established the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1925 and pursued policies to strengthen central authority and reduce foreign influence.

Iran’s internal political structure, development goals and motivations for participation were based on the following principles:

  • Internal Legitimacy and Institutional Balances: Reza Shah derived his legitimacy from the military and bureaucracy, pursuing a nation-state construction based on nationalism. Facing social and secularization-related conflicts with the powerful and traditional Shia clergy, the Shah chose to enhance his regime’s legitimacy and recognition by improving relations with neighbors and integrating into the international system.
  • Search for an Independent Foreign Policy: One of the main objectives of Iran’s foreign policy was to fully break free from the historical dominance of Britain and the Soviet Union.【8】 To counter the political pressure exerted by these two great powers, Iran adopted a strategy of cultivating good relations with neighboring states and forming regional alliances.
  • Economic Interests and New Transport Routes: Iran aimed to reduce the economic dependence of northern Iran on Soviet Russia. Participation in the pact provided an economic rationale: gaining access to Western markets via Turkish ports and establishing new trade and transport corridors.
  • Border Security and Stability: Iran, having resolved its border disputes with eastern and western neighbors through Türkiye’s mediation and arbitration, sought through this pact to firmly establish border security and create a stable external environment to focus on internal reforms.

Afghanistan’s Regime Stability and International Recognition Process

Afghanistan’s path to joining the pact was shaped by the diplomatic pressures arising from the British-Russian rivalry in Central Asia since the 19th century and the country’s internal regime changes and quest for stability. After gaining independence in 1919 under the leadership of Amanullah Khan, the country initiated Western-style modernization reforms; however, social backlash against these reforms led to a coup in 1929.【9】

Afghanistan’s internal political structure, regime stability and motivations for participation were based on the following considerations:

  • Balancing Internal Threats and Legitimacy: After the 1929 coup, Nadir Shah assumed power and, following his assassination in 1933, his son Zahir Shah ascended the throne. These newly installed administrative elites pursued a policy of cultivating good relations with neighbors and increasing international recognition to balance internal opposition and political instability.
  • Balancing Great Power Competition: The Afghan government, wary of the historical rivalry between Britain and the Soviet Union, aimed to limit external intervention by forging strong diplomatic ties with Türkiye and Iran.
  • Containing Growing German Influence: From the second half of the 1930s, increasing German financial capital and arms flows into the country created new concerns about dependency under Zahir Shah’s rule. In response, Afghanistan sought regional cooperation channels to counterbalance German influence.
  • International Integration and Border Consolidation: Having joined the League of Nations in 1934, Afghanistan resolved its border disputes with Iran in 1935 under Türkiye’s arbitration. Joining the Sadabad Pact as a founding member was viewed as a step toward securing its external security and completing its process of international recognition.

Structure, Articles and Legal Content of the Pact

The Sadabad Pact, prepared in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27 August 1928, is a regional security and friendship treaty consisting of ten articles. The fundamental obligations, consultation mechanisms and non-aggression principles established by the treaty are based on the following legal provisions:

  • Principle of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs: Article one legally obliges the signatory states to strictly refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs and to respect mutual sovereignty.
  • Inviolability of Borders: Under article two, the parties pledged to respect the inviolability of their common borders.
  • Consultation and Joint Action Mechanism: Article three established a diplomatic mechanism requiring the signatory states to consult each other and seek common ground on any international issue affecting their common interests.
  • Non-Aggression Commitment: Under article four, the parties pledged not to launch direct attacks against each other, either independently or with the support of another state, and not to join any political alliance or coalition with hostile intent.
  • Security and Termination Protocol: Article six contains direct security and enforcement provisions. According to this article, if any signatory state engages in an aggressive act against a third state, the other members of the pact have the right to immediately terminate and annul the agreement against the aggressor without prior notice.

Overall, the legal content of the Sadabad Pact reflects a non-aggression pact structure focused on preserving the regional status quo, fostering good neighborly relations and resolving disputes through legal and diplomatic means, rather than establishing a military command structure or mandatory military intervention obligations.

International Public Opinion

The establishment and signing of the Sadabad Pact were evaluated by global actors and international press outlets from different political and strategic perspectives.

The attitudes of the great powers and international public opinion toward the pact were as follows:

  • Britain’s Approach: Britain initially rejected Türkiye’s first proposals for a Middle Eastern pact in 1933 and 1934, citing the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact as making such an agreement unnecessary. However, following Germany and Italy’s revisionist policies, British diplomacy shifted toward preserving the status quo. While not directly joining the pact, Britain supported and encouraged its formation behind the scenes to reduce Italian influence and contain Soviet power in the region.
  • Soviet Union’s Approach: The Soviet Union was uneasy about Türkiye’s rapprochement with Britain and Britain’s active role in the pact process. In an article published in Pravda one day before the pact’s signing, it was claimed that Britain was exploiting the anxieties of small regional states for its own interests.【10】 To soothe Moscow, the Turkish delegation visited Moscow and assured the Soviet Union that the pact was not directed against it.
  • European and Western Press Evaluations: The French press welcomed the pact and interpreted it as a sign of Türkiye’s alignment with the Western bloc. The American press described the pact as a peaceful development, while the Polish press emphasized it as a success of Turkish diplomacy and a means of securing Türkiye’s eastern borders.【11】 Newspapers such as Great Britain and East in Britain and Samouprava in Belgrade highlighted Türkiye’s leadership in promoting reforms and a peaceful mission among neighboring Eastern states.
  • Revisionist States’ Press Policy: Italian and German press organs published articles portraying the signed agreement as a structure designed against Britain.
  • Arab World and Regional Public Opinion: While the Iraqi press, one of the signatory states, merely reported the development as routine news and avoided praise, the Egyptian press, outside the pact, showed great interest. The Egyptian press welcomed the gathering of four states with a combined population of 60 million and suggested that this pact could serve as a model for Arab states to unite among themselves.【12】

Entry into Force, Operation and Historical Fate of the Pact

After the signing process was completed, the Sadabad Pact entered the stages of legal ratification and implementation. Its ratification and subsequent chronological developments unfolded as follows:

  • Ratification Processes and Entry into Force: The pact was formally ratified by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye on 14 January 1938. After the other participating states completed their internal legal ratification procedures, the treaty officially entered into force on 25 June 1938.【13】
  • Status During the Second World War: The operation of the pact was directly interrupted shortly after its entry into force by the outbreak of the Second World War. With the war’s commencement, no joint or effective security mechanism could be operated within the pact’s framework.
  • Loss of Function and Political Fate: Instabilities in the domestic politics of the founding states and external interventions prepared the ground for the pact’s de facto demise. The Hikmet Süleyman government, established after the coup, was forced to resign shortly after the pact’s signing. By 1941, one of the pact’s greatest security concerns materialized: Iranian territory was militarily occupied from the north by the Soviet Union and from the south by Britain.【14】


As a result of the military interventions and occupations by the great powers, the Sadabad Pact, although formally still in existence on paper, completely lost its functionality and operational capacity. After the Second World War, it ceased to be an active mechanism and was entirely forgotten. Nevertheless, the pact served as a historical precedent for subsequent regional cooperation initiatives by Middle Eastern states, such as the Baghdad Pact.

Bibliographies

Aydın, İmren, and Hikmet Zeki Kapcı. "II. Dünya Savaşı'na Giriş Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Aldığı İç Politika Tedbirleri (1 Eylül 1939 - 18 Ocak 1940)." *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 32, no. 45 (December 2018): 109–130. Accessed July 9, 2026.https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/erusosbilder/article/447377

Erdal, İbrahim. "Afganistan’ın Modernleşme Süreci ve Dış Politikasında Türkiye’nin Etkisi (1920-1973)." *Genel Türk Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4, no. 8 (July 2022): 925-938. Accessed July 9, 2026.https://doi.org/10.53718/gttad.1118725

Palabıyık, Mustafa Serdar. "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme." *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 2, no. 3 (July 2010): 147–179. Accessed July 9, 2026.https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/209569

Tamahkar, Ali. "Modernite Çerçevesinde Türk-İran İlişkileri (1923-1936)." Uluslararası Afro-Avrasya Araştırmaları Dergisi 7, no. 14 (June 2022): 1–10. Accessed July 9, 2026.https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/2309785

Çelik, Mustafa Edip. "Türkiye'nin Sadabad Paktı Ekseninde Şekillenen Ortadoğu Politikası." *History Studies* 10, no. 8 (November 2018): 93-108. Accessed July 9, 2026.https://www.historystudies.net/dergi/turkiyenin-sadabad-pakti-ekseninde-sekillenen-ortadogu-politikasi201811d7083f9.pdf

Citations

  • [1]

    Mustafa Edip Çelik, "Türkiye'nin Sadabad Paktı Ekseninde Şekillenen Ortadoğu Politikası," *History Studies* 10, no. 8 (November 2018): 101, Accessed July 2, 2026,https://www.historystudies.net/dergi/turkiyenin-sadabad-pakti-ekseninde-sekillenen-ortadogu-politikasi201811d7083f9.pdf

  • [2]

    Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," Ortadoğu Etütleri 2 (3), (Temmuz 2010): 155, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Temmuz 2026, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/209569

  • [3]

    Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," Ortadoğu Etütleri 2 (3), (Temmuz 2010): 155, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Temmuz 2026, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/209569

  • [4]

    İmren Aydın and Hikmet Zeki Kapcı, "II. Dünya Savaşı'na Giriş Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Aldığı İç Politika Tedbirleri (1 Eylül 1939-18 Ocak 1940)," *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 45, no. 2 (December 2018): 114. Accessed July 2, 2026.

  • [5]

    Mustafa Edip Çelik, "Türkiye'nin Sadabad Paktı Ekseninde Şekillenen Ortadoğu Politikası," *History Studies* 10, no. 8 (November 2018): 102. Accessed July 2, 2026.

  • [6]

    Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," Ortadoğu Etütleri 2, sy. 3 (Temmuz 2010): 161, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Temmuz 2026, https://doi.org/10.1138/orsam.oe.2.3.147.

  • [7]

    Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," Ortadoğu Etütleri 2, sy. 3 (Temmuz 2010): 162, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Temmuz 2026, https://doi.org/10.1138/orsam.oe.2.3.147.

  • [8]

    Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," Ortadoğu Etütleri 2 (3), (Temmuz 2010): 164, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Temmuz 2026, https://doi.org/10.1138/orsam.oe.2.3.147.

  • [9]

    Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," Ortadoğu Etütleri 2 (3), (Temmuz 2010): 167, Erişim Tarihi: 2 Temmuz 2026, https://doi.org/10.1138/orsam.oe.2.3.147.

  • [10]

    Mustafa Edip Çelik, "Türkiye'nin Sadabad Paktı Ekseninde Şekillenen Ortadoğu Politikası," *History Studies* 10, no. 8 (November 2018): 104, Accessed July 9, 2026,https://doi.org/10.9737/hist.2018.665.

  • [11]

    Mustafa Edip Çelik, "Türkiye'nin Sadabad Paktı Ekseninde Şekillenen Ortadoğu Politikası," *History Studies* 10, no. 8 (November 2018): 104, Accessed July 9, 2026.

  • [12]

    Mustafa Edip Çelik, "Türkiye'nin Sadabad Paktı Ekseninde Şekillenen Ortadoğu Politikası," *History Studies* 10, no. 8 (November 2018): 104, Accessed July 9, 2026.

  • [13]

    Mustafa Edip Çelik, "Türkiye'nin Sadabad Paktı Ekseninde Şekillenen Ortadoğu Politikası," *History Studies* 10, no. 8 (November 2018): 102, Accessed July 9, 2026.

  • [14]

    Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," Ortadoğu Etütleri 2, sy. 3 (Temmuz 2010): 166, Erişim Tarihi: 9 Temmuz 2026, https://doi.org/10.1138/orsam.oe.2.3.147.

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AuthorMustafa Cem İnciJuly 11, 2026 at 12:12 PM

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Contents

  • Historical Background and the Path to the Pact

  • Internal Political Structures and Motivations of the Founding States

    • Türkiye’s Security and Regional Approach

    • Iraq’s Domestic Political Balances and Foreign Policy Aspirations

    • Iran’s Independent Foreign Policy and Development Goals

    • Afghanistan’s Regime Stability and International Recognition Process

  • Structure, Articles and Legal Content of the Pact

  • International Public Opinion

  • Entry into Force, Operation and Historical Fate of the Pact