#24 Gray Area

The free trade agreement signed between the European Union and India last week may appear at first glance to be merely a matter of trade liberalization, but it reflects a strategic shift occurring at a time when global politics has hardened and the Western bloc is showing signs of strain. The conclusion of these free trade negotiations this year, which began in 2007, were suspended in 2013, and revived in 2022, is no coincidence in this context.

Beyond lowering customs tariffs, the agreement signals the EU and India’s search for new strategic partners amid a difficult period in their relations with the United States. In this context, the symbolic importance and timing of the agreement are as significant as the agreement itself. This latest deal complements the EU’s efforts to diversify its trade network through agreements with Japan, Mexico, Indonesia and countries in South America, and holds similar significance for India.

Launched with the ambitious title “the mother of all agreements,” the deal was announced at the India–EU Summit held in New Delhi. By removing trade barriers, India’s vast population offers European companies privileged access to the world’s most populous market. The agreement also emerges as the final step in the EU and India’s effort to reduce the influence of the United States and China.

At this point, the agreement can be seen not only as an economic initiative but also as a product of geopolitical realignment shaped by pressures from the United States and China on both countries. This situation once again highlights that in global trade decisions, security and dependency relationships matter as much as efficiency. This elevates the agreement beyond the economic sphere and transforms it into a geopolitical message.

On the European side, this message is most clearly interpreted in the context of relations with the United States. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has revived the “America First” approach in a more troubling manner for Europe. Ongoing political tensions over Ukraine and Greenland, combined with customs duties imposed by the United States, have increased unpredictability in transatlantic relations and caused deep fissures within the Western alliance.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s characterization of the agreement as an effort to “deepen the partnership between the world’s largest democracies” implies a quest to build an alternative to U.S.-centric, single-polar dependencies. Von der Leyen’s emphasis on “rules-based cooperation” is clearly interpreted as a direct reference to the global order’s erosion during the Trump era.

For India, which has seen its relations with the United States deteriorate during Trump’s second term, the agreement carries a similar political meaning. The personal rapport between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Donald Trump had weakened after Trump’s attempt to resolve the India–Pakistan crisis in line with his Nobel Peace Prize ambitions received no response from New Delhi.

This political tension also affected U.S. trade policy toward India. The United States first imposed a 25 percent customs duty on Indian goods citing reciprocity, then added another 25 percent sanction due to India’s continued oil imports from Russia, raising the total tariff rate to 50 percent.

China emerges as another decisive factor in the EU–India equation. Due to growing commercial ties and increasingly sensitive relations with the United States, neither the EU nor India is in a position to sever ties completely with China. After all, China is by far the largest import partner for both the EU and India. China accounts for approximately 21 percent of the EU’s total imports and 15 percent of India’s imports. Consequently, commercial and technological dependence on China constitutes a strategic risk for both sides.

China’s efforts to gain influence over the EU extend beyond commercial ties and occasionally surface in the form of espionage activities. Meanwhile, China’s deep military cooperation with Pakistan, India’s longstanding rival, sharpens India’s security perceptions regarding China. In this context, the EU–India agreement aims not only to reduce mutual dependence on China but also to enable both parties to assume a more balanced role in international politics.

Russia presents one of the most fragile points in the EU–India rapprochement. For the EU, Russia is an outright adversary that must be contained, while for India, Russia remains an indispensable strategic partner, particularly regarding the Kashmir issue and considering its veto power in the UN Security Council. Thus, while the EU expects India to distance itself from Russia, it is clear that India is not particularly willing to do so.

On the other hand, India’s relations with Russia can serve, from the EU’s perspective, as a kind of backdoor channel. In the past, routing Russian oil through India to European markets enabled Europe to maintain energy security while avoiding public pressure. This contradictory dynamic constitutes a significant point of tension in EU–India relations, yet simultaneously offers Europe a potential avenue to maintain indirect ties with Russia out of sight.

The EU’s agreement with India must be understood not as a simple trade move but as part of a broader strategy. The EU’s recent elevation of its relations with Vietnam, with which it signed a similar free trade agreement six years ago, to the level of a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” points to the same geopolitical logic.

In this framework, the free trade agreement with India, like the examples of Vietnam and Mercosur, stands out as concrete tools to defend a rules-based international order against the increasingly aggressive protectionist economic policies of the United States. Through these agreements, the European Union seeks not only to expand market access but also to uphold free trade principles and assume a more balanced role in the global economy.

One of the most shocking developments in China in recent days has been the dismissal of one of the country’s top military figures. The official publication of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), PLA Daily, announced the removal of Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department. The statement indicated that these individuals had “seriously damaged the authority and image of the CMC leadership” and “caused grave harm to the Party, the state, and the military.”

In Chinese political language, such statements are typically read as veiled accusations of corruption or disloyalty. However, Zhang’s position elevates this purge beyond a routine anti-corruption campaign. Zhang was the second most powerful figure in the military hierarchy after Chinese leader Xi Jinping and was widely regarded as one of Xi’s closest and most trusted allies. Consequently, this development has sparked debate about power dynamics within Chinese politics.

What makes Zhang Youxia so significant is both his personal background and his position within the system. The 75-year-old Zhang, who actively participated in combat during China’s wars with Vietnam, stood apart from many Chinese generals who rose to prominence during peacetime. Moreover, the fact that Xi Jinping’s and Zhang’s fathers fought together in the same military unit during the Communist revolution means their personal connection extends back to childhood.

Because of these personal ties, Zhang had long been one of Xi’s most trusted figures in the military. Therefore, this dismissal is interpreted as a powerful signal that Xi is either consolidating power to an extreme degree or demonstrating that even his closest associates are not exempt from anti-corruption measures.

This development also brings renewed attention to the current state of the Central Military Commission. Normally composed of seven members, the CMC has effectively been reduced to just two individuals due to recent arrests and dismissals. The only remaining member of the CMC alongside President Xi Jinping is General Zhang Shengmin, who replaced another vice chairman, He Weidong, removed in October 2025.

The Chinese Central Military Commission is the supreme military structure, overseeing not only the army, navy, and air force but also nuclear arsenals, police, and militia forces. Therefore, its drastic reduction raises questions about the practical abandonment of collective leadership in China. The increasing concentration of military decision-making in the hands of a narrow circle—or even a single leader—clearly demonstrates the extent of power centralization in China.

The reasons behind Zhang Youxia’s downfall remain unclear. While official statements cite “violations of discipline and law,” numerous speculations circulate regarding the true cause. Rumors range from leaking nuclear secrets to the United States to planning a military coup. One of the most prominent allegations links the dismissal to the Taiwan issue.

According to U.S. intelligence assessments, Xi has set a goal for the PLA to achieve the military capability to seize Taiwan by 2027. It is suggested that Zhang’s assessment that this timeline was unrealistic may have displeased Xi and played a role in his dismissal. If this interpretation is correct, the issue reflects not a corruption narrative but a profound disagreement over strategic vision and military capacity.

The events in China compel a reassessment of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Since coming to power, Xi has launched a sweeping cleanup under the slogan “tigers and flies,” targeting both high-ranking officials and low-level bureaucrats. While the official narrative frames this campaign as an effort to eradicate corruption at its roots, it also serves to consolidate Xi’s authority and weaken the influence of aging elites.

Today, Xi has left almost no one within the Party or military who could challenge him or offer dissent. To some, this grants him a level of control unseen since Mao Zedong. Yet it also leaves open the question of how suppressed tensions within the system will manifest in the future. Zhang Youxia’s dismissal has already secured its place in history as one of the most striking signs of this tension.

Recent steps taken regarding the status of Kurds in Syria signal a significant break from the Syrian state’s historical conception of identity. The decisions issued by Syria’s Ministry of Interior last week and the special decree issued by President Ahmed al-Shara convey strong messages that the exclusionary policies of the Baathist regime are being left behind.

The Syrian Ministry of Interior announced it had implemented a new decree mandating the granting of citizenship to Syrians of Kurdish origin. The decree specifically targets Kurds previously classified as stateless or undocumented, promising them full equality. This move aims to formally end the legal uncertainty that has persisted since the Baath era.

This step is part of a broader political framework outlined in a special decree issued earlier by President Ahmed al-Shara. That decree explicitly affirmed that Syrian Kurds are an inseparable part of the nation and that their rights are guaranteed by the state. This affirmation is notable as it represents the first time in Syrian history that the collective existence of Kurds has been officially recognized with such clarity.

To fully appreciate the significance of these developments, it is essential to recall the policies Kurds endured under the Baath regime. Throughout the rule of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, the Syrian state defined itself as a clearly bounded Arab nation and refused to recognize Kurds as a distinct group. This approach translated beyond rhetoric into concrete mechanisms of exclusion in law and citizenship.

The most concrete example of this approach was the highly controversial 1962 census conducted in the Hasaka governorate. As a result, approximately 20 percent of Syria’s Kurdish population was stripped of citizenship and classified as “foreigners” or “undocumented,” depriving them of many fundamental rights including education, property ownership, public employment, and freedom of movement.

This legal exclusion under the Baath regime was mirrored by cultural repression. For instance, Decree No. 768 issued in 2000 banned the sale of Kurdish-language cassettes and videos and reinforced existing restrictions on Kurds. This demonstrated the Baath regime’s dual stance: supporting the PKK against Turkey while simultaneously pursuing exclusionary policies against Syria’s Kurdish population.

The new Syrian government’s decisions aim to reverse the exclusionary legacy of the Baath regime. Revoking all exceptional legal consequences stemming from the 1962 census effectively nullifies one of the most enduring instruments of exclusion from the Baath era. Granting citizenship rights to Kurds in Syria seeks to redefine their relationship with the state within the framework of equal citizenship.