1944 Ahiska Turk Deportation

The 1944 Deportation of the Meskhetian Turks is a mass forced displacement carried out by the Soviet Union on 14–15 November 1944, in which approximately 90,000 to 117,000 Meskhetian Turks living in the Ahıska region of Georgia were forcibly relocated to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan under the pretext of “security.”^【1】

This deportation was one of the largest forced migration operations conducted by Stalin’s regime against ethnic minorities during World War II. It marked a historic turning point that profoundly affected the demographic structure, cultural continuity, and identity of the community. The deportation of the Meskhetian Turks is significant for initiating the transformation of Soviet nationality policy and launching a prolonged process of dispersal and struggle for rights among the Meskhetian Turks.

The Meskhetian Turks are a Turkic-speaking and Muslim community that historically lived in the southwestern region of Georgia, known today as Samtshe-Javakheti, around Adıgön, Ahıska, Ahılkelek, Aspinza, and Bogdanovka. The formation of their identity was shaped by the region’s historical events and the multiethnic character of the Caucasus. During the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, various states and researchers used different names to refer to the Meskhetian Turks, and their ethnic origin, identity, and historical continuity were occasionally subjects of political debate.

Before the 1944 deportation, the Meskhetian Turks primarily identified themselves as “Turk” or “Caucasian Turk.” However, the Soviet administration recorded this group as “Azerbaijani” in the 1939 census. Georgia at times described them as “Muslim Georgian,” interpreting them as descendants of the Georgian people. Although the term “Meskhetian Turks” was officially adopted for international use during the 1998 Hague Negotiations, Georgia has never formally recognized this term. Nevertheless, a significant portion of the community continues to identify as “Ahıska Turk” today.

The region inhabited by the Meskhetian Turks has historically been a crossroads of strategic routes and a theater of struggle among various states. Following the Moscow Treaty of 16 March 1921 and the Kars Treaty of 13 October 1921, the region came under Soviet control, placing the community directly under the influence of Soviet nationality policies and regional security strategies. This layered political structure of the region contributed to the formation of Meskhetian Turk identity through both local and imperial influences.

Historically, the Ahıska region, situated along strategic transit routes in southern Caucasus, was a battleground for administrative and military struggles between the Ottoman Empire and Russian and Georgian political entities. The regional structure formed under Russian rule from the late 19th century underwent significant changes due to World War I and subsequent political transformations. As a result of the Moscow Treaty of 16 March 1921 and the Kars Treaty of 13 October 1921, Ahıska and its surroundings came under Soviet control. From that date onward, the region fell directly under the influence of Soviet policies, border security strategies, and regional socioeconomic transformations.

The 1920s corresponded to the first phase of Soviet nationality policy known as “korenizatsiya” (indigenization). During this period, the Soviet administration pursued a form of pluralism that strengthened local elites and supported cultural institutions of various ethnic communities. The Meskhetian Turks largely preserved their regional culture, linguistic practices, and social organizations within this framework. However, while this process was ideologically grounded in the principle of “equality among Soviet nations,” a significant shift in Soviet state policy became evident from the mid-1930s.

In the 1930s, rising security concerns fundamentally transformed Stalin’s nationality policy. This transformation merged with deep suspicion toward communities living along the borders, leading to the establishment of a new centralized control mechanism centered on notions of “political loyalty” and “national security.” Particularly, the Ahıska region bordering Turkey was regarded as a sensitive line within Soviet security doctrine, and the Meskhetian Turks were defined as “a population living near the border with potential external connections.” Soviet reports claimed that this community could establish ties with Turkey and exhibit cross-border mobility. This narrative laid the political groundwork for the official justification of the deportation in subsequent years.

The Soviet Union’s redefined security outlook in these years had direct consequences for many non-Slavic groups, including the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, and Karachay-Malkars. The core feature of this transformation was the tendency to classify ethnic identities as threats to national security. In this context, the Ahıska region was classified as an ethnic and strategic “security risk.”

In the 1939 Soviet census, the Meskhetian Turks were officially categorized as “Azerbaijanis,” reflecting the interventionist stance of Soviet administrative policy toward ethnic identities in the region. This practice clearly demonstrated an attempt to redefine the community’s cultural identity within Soviet terminology. During the same period, the regional economy was reorganized along the lines of collectivization and the consolidation of agricultural production, significantly altering the community’s traditional way of life.

In the early 1940s, the pressure of World War II on Soviet domestic policy intensified suspicion toward communities living along the borders, and the political foundations for decisions determining the future of the Meskhetian Turks matured during this period. The deportation decision of 1944 was the final link in this long-term political transformation and the security-centered approach.

The shift in nationality policy in the Soviet Socialist Republics since the late 1920s was one of the key determinants of the process leading to the 1944 Ahıska deportation. After Lenin, Stalin’s regime reshaped the ideological framework of the system and, from the mid-1930s, abandoned the korenizatsiya policy aimed at strengthening local identities, replacing it with a centralized, Russification, and security-oriented approach. This approach directly affected ethnic communities perceived by the Soviet regime as “questionably loyal,” especially those living along the borders.

This new political framework under Stalin hardened further with the outbreak of World War II. The Soviet state’s perception of security merged with the socialist ideology’s notion of the “internal enemy,” creating a basis for the reclassification of ethnic groups according to their loyalty to the state. The Ahıska region, sharing a border with Turkey, was viewed as a strategically sensitive front line during this period, and the Meskhetian Turks were included among the groups distrusted by central authorities due to allegations of potential ties across the border.

During this period, not only the Meskhetian Turks but also the Crimean Tatars, Karachays, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, and many other Muslim or non-Slavic communities became targets under similar justifications. The Soviet regime collectively questioned the loyalty of these peoples during wartime and assessed them as potential security risks. Stalin’s regime adopted the concept of “collective guilt,” based on the idea that certain behaviors should be punished at the community level rather than individually. This notion formed the ideological background for the mass deportations carried out in the 1940s.

Another factor fueling political insecurity was the Soviet central government’s view that the concentration of national minorities along the borders posed military and strategic risks. In this context, the demographic cohesion of the Turkish population in Ahıska was interpreted by Soviet officials as a “geopolitical risk,” and its transformation into a security frontier influenced decisions determining the community’s future. The extraordinary conditions of war made these political concerns more visible and interventionist.

Reports and operational plans prepared by the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) before the deportation decision of 1944 demonstrate that suspicion toward the Meskhetian Turks had become institutionalized as official policy. The preparatory process conducted between September and November 1944 represents the most concrete manifestation of this policy approach.

The security-centered policy initiated in the 1930s laid the groundwork for the preparation of the 1944 deportation. In the period preceding the deportation, Soviet authorities carried out bureaucratic preparations such as population registration, household listing, and reporting by local units. These practices were consistent with standard NKVD procedures used in the deportation of various other populations between 1943 and 1944. Oral history studies and human rights analyses show that during this period, military presence increased in Meskhetian settlements, freedom of movement was effectively restricted, and the community was under intense state surveillance.

Another crucial element of the preparation phase was the military and logistical control of the Ahıska region. In the autumn of 1944, NKVD units were gradually deployed to the area, roads were placed under surveillance, and exits from the region were restricted. These measures fully mirrored the model used in other major Soviet deportations (Crimean Tatars, Chechen–Ingush, Karachay). It is known that local units were kept under strict discipline to ensure the operation’s secrecy.

The final stage of preparation involved establishing the necessary infrastructure. During this period, the NKVD determined the animal-drawn wagons, railway lines, and assembly points required for transporting the population to be deported.

The deportation process was implemented across all districts inhabited by the Meskhetian Turks—Adıgön, Ahılkelek, Ahıska, Aspinza, and Bogdanovka—in a manner that fundamentally altered the region’s demographic structure.^【2】

On the morning the operation began, NKVD units launched sudden raids on villages, informing families to gather their belongings and proceed to designated assembly points within a short time. This procedure was identical to those used in the deportations of other communities in 1944, including the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and Ingush. Families were often allowed to take only the most essential belongings; agricultural land, homes, and livestock were left behind.

The gathered population was transported under military escort to pre-designated assembly points and then loaded into closed wagons intended for animal transport. These wagons, as in other ethnic deportations, were unsuitable for human habitation, with severe deficiencies in heating, ventilation, and basic living needs. Many families were separated during this process; the elderly and children suffered greatly due to the harsh conditions.^【3】

The forced migration caravans embarked on a journey lasting weeks from Ahıska to Central Asia. Due to wartime strain on railway lines, shipments were frequently delayed or halted, making survival particularly difficult for the elderly, children, and the sick. Food supplies were severely limited, and the rations distributed were often insufficient and irregular. Access to water was possible only during brief stops at designated stations, which frequently failed to meet the needs of the overcrowded wagons.

A significant portion of the deported population perished during the journey due to the combined effects of extreme cold, disease, and lack of hygiene. Children and elderly individuals were the most vulnerable groups. The majority of those who died en route were buried hastily by family members at the stops.

The majority of the deported were directed to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The dispersal of Meskhetian Turks across various regions of Central Asia was a typical application of the Soviet government’s strategy of demographic dilution, preventing the community from regaining a majority in any single area. The journey often lasted weeks, and due to limited access to food and water, deaths were common among children and the elderly. This situation resembled the high mortality rates observed in other forced relocations of the period.

After the operation was completed, Soviet authorities rapidly reopened the region for resettlement and relocated other ethnic groups into the villages abandoned by the Meskhetian Turks. Thus, the deportation took on the character of a demographic intervention aimed at permanently altering the region’s ethnic composition.

^{Deportation of the Meskhetian Turks (}AA⁾

According to Soviet archival documents, the deportation of Turkish, Kurdish, and Hemshin communities living in Ahıska and its surroundings was presented as a necessary measure for state security. A document dated 28 November 1944 and marked “Completely Secret” contains the following statements regarding these communities:

• "A significant majority of this population, having kinship ties with the population near the Turkish border, is engaged in smuggling, shows a tendency to migrate, and serves as a source for recruiting spies and forming bandit groups for Turkish intelligence agencies."^【4】

This narrative asserts that the deportation was justified not by the behavior of an ethnic community but by national security concerns. The same document states that state security and police services along the Turkish border were significantly reinforced before the evacuation:

• “To prevent those to be evacuated from crossing the border, state security and police services along the Turkish border were reinforced to the maximum extent to ensure the strictest possible security."^【5】

The documents indicate that approximately 91,095 individuals were evacuated and sent to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.^【6】

Another report dated 14 December 1944 provides the demographic distribution of the deported population:

• “A total of 53,163 persons have been resettled, comprising 10,813 men, 16,127 women, and 26,223 children under the age of 16. 293 persons died en route." ^【7】

A special legal regime was applied in the regions where the deported population was settled. A decree of the Council of People’s Commissars dated 8 January 1945 stated that the deportees would be punished under existing laws for violations of labor regulations and other prohibited activities, and those who left their resettlement areas would be considered fugitives.

Soviet correspondence clearly states that a significant portion of the deported population arrived at their destinations without adequate food or clothing. In a letter dated 10 January 1945, NKVD official Meyer of the Kazakh SSR wrote:

• "Approximately 15 percent of the migrants (8,000 people) have not had their needs for food, clothing, footwear, and other essentials met."^【8】

This statement highlights the fundamental deprivation experienced by the deported community.

Soviet documents position the deportation of the Meskhetian Turks as part of the USSR’s broader policy of mass resettlement against other ethnic groups. Indeed, a 1946 report states:

• “Turks, Hemshins, and Kurds: 88,800 persons… are subject to a special resettlement regime on Soviet territory."^【9】

This data reveals that the Ahıska deportation was not an isolated event but part of a large-scale demographic engineering policy.

Although Soviet official documents attempted to legitimize the Ahıska deportation on security grounds, they clearly show that the evacuation was carried out under harsh conditions, that the community was kept under strict administrative control through a special resettlement regime, and that there were serious deficiencies in meeting basic needs.

Following the 1944 deportation, the Meskhetian Turks were dispersed across various regions of Central Asia under the Soviet Union’s “special settler” (spetsposelenets) status and forced to live under strict administrative surveillance. This status was a mechanism that severely restricted individuals’ legal and social rights, limited their freedom of movement, and imposed direct state control over daily life.

Under the special resettlement regime, the Meskhetian Turks were typically placed in rural areas of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan within collective farms (kolkhozes) and state farms (sovkhozes), and were continuously monitored by local administrative units known as komendatura. Under this system, deportees were forbidden to leave their settlement units without permission. Every adult was required to sign in periodically at the komendatura. This practice served as a primary tool enabling the state to monitor the community’s daily movements and control potential “security risks.”

Conditions encountered in the resettlement areas immediately after the deportation were extremely harsh. The Meskhetian Turks were often placed in abandoned or derelict barracks, mud-brick dwellings, or temporary shelters provided by local populations; many struggled with housing shortages in the first years. Extreme cold during winter months, insufficient fuel, and limited infrastructure further worsened living conditions. Food supply became a major problem in the early years; despite compulsory labor on collective farms, the rations distributed were insufficient to meet families’ basic nutritional needs.

Economic life was largely based on collective agricultural activities. The Meskhetian Turks were viewed as a vital labor force in the postwar reconstruction of the Soviet economy, contributing intensively to cotton farming, animal husbandry, construction, and irrigation projects. Nevertheless, they were sometimes denied control over their own production rights.

Education and cultural life were also affected by the restrictive nature of the special resettlement status. Since instruction in schools was conducted in Russian and local languages, Meskhetian Turks were unable to receive education in their native language; the establishment of cultural institutions depended on permission procedures under komendatura control. This became a significant factor limiting the community’s cultural production capacity. Nevertheless, the Meskhetian Turks continued to preserve their cultural identity through traditional family structures and religious practices.

Religious life was officially restricted; mosque construction and organized worship activities were subject to state permission. Nevertheless, it is known that religious rituals continued within homes or small community groups. These practices became an essential component of identity preservation under deportation conditions.

The “special settler” status, while severely restricting the social and legal rights of the Meskhetian Turks, also fostered the strengthening of solidarity networks within the community. Joint production activities, family solidarity, and local organizational efforts played a crucial role in coping with the hardships of deportation.

This status continued until the beginning of the thaw period following Stalin’s death and was formally abolished only in 1956 as a result of Nikita Khrushchev’s initiatives. However, unlike other deported peoples, the Meskhetian Turks were not granted the right to return to their homeland; the lifting of the status merely ended surveillance. Thus, the period from 1944 to 1956 remains etched in historical memory as the phase during which the community endured the most intense physical and social restrictions.

In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev’s initiation of “de-Stalinization” at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led to the legal reassessment of Stalin’s harsh policies and formally exonerated millions of “special settlers,” including the Meskhetian Turks, from the charge of “collective guilt.” As a result, the komendatura regime was lifted, and the community was legally freed from the 12-year restriction on movement and administrative surveillance. However, this legal change did not improve their most fundamental demand: the right to return to their homeland.

While the Soviet regime granted partial return rights to some groups such as the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, and Karachays, it refused to permit the Meskhetian Turks to resettle within the borders of the Georgian SSR. This reflects the continued suspicion toward the community within Soviet nationality policy. The Georgian SSR government explicitly rejected the return, arguing that it would disrupt the region’s demographic balance and cause regional instability; the Soviet central government supported this stance. Thus, the post-1956 period became one in which de facto non-return was institutionalized despite legal emancipation.

Legal freedom brought some improvements to the social and economic life of the Meskhetian Turks but did not eliminate the structural problems created during the deportation years. During this period, the community began establishing new living areas across various regions of Central Asia; their dependence on the kolkhoz and sovkhoz system gradually gave way to more independent forms of work. Although access to educational institutions expanded, opportunities for developing their own language and cultural institutions remained limited due to the general framework of Soviet policy.

Another significant feature of the post-1956 period was the permanent nature of geographic dispersal. The community became scattered across settlement units in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and partially in the Russian Federation; this led to a fragmented character in family structures and internal social organization. Unlike during the deportation years, the expansion of freedom of movement encouraged younger generations to seek new employment and educational opportunities across the Soviet geography, accelerating internal migration dynamics within the community.

On the other hand, the denial of the right to return laid the groundwork for a new phase of political and social struggle for the Meskhetian Turks. Beginning in the 1960s, various petition campaigns, collective appeals, and rights advocacy initiatives emerged within the community; however, these efforts largely proved fruitless before the Georgian SSR and Moscow authorities. These demands were evaluated in Soviet archives as a “manageable but non-reversible issue”; this approach contributed to the long-term entrenchment of the Meskhetian Turks’ non-return status.

The violent incidents in Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley in 1989, targeting the Meskhetian Turks, are regarded as one of the most significant ruptures in the community’s history since the 1944 deportation. Occurring during the Soviet Union’s dissolution process, amid growing economic hardship and social unrest, these events rapidly spread across a wide area as local tensions turned into ethnic conflict. The Fergana attacks disrupted the Meskhetian Turks’ decades-long efforts to establish roots in the regions where they had been resettled; security concerns triggered a new mass migration movement.

Among the causes of these events were the uncertainties of the post-Soviet transition, economic hardship, and local competition dynamics. Rising unemployment, perceptions of unfair resource distribution, and the vacuum of political authority deepened the conflict environment. The Meskhetian Turks had a significant presence in the Fergana Valley in agriculture, animal husbandry, and small-scale trade; this made them a focal point of local competition amid economic hardship. Simultaneously, the rapid weakening of central Soviet authority made it difficult to contain the attacks and contributed to their rapid escalation.

During the Fergana events, Meskhetian Turkish homes, businesses, and property were targeted; a significant portion of the community was evacuated due to security fears. In the aftermath, Soviet authorities launched a large-scale evacuation program to control the spread of violence, relocating the majority of Meskhetian Turks from Fergana to various parts of the country. During this process, approximately 70,000 Meskhetian Turks experienced the second largest mass displacement in their history since the Tsarist and Soviet periods.

The evacuated members were largely directed to the Rostov, Krasnodar, and Stavropol regions of the Russian Federation, as well as to rural areas of Azerbaijan and Ukraine. However, since this relocation was not based on a permanent and organized resettlement program, the community faced various integration challenges in their new settlements. For example, Meskhetian Turks in the Krasnodar Krai remained deprived of fundamental rights such as citizenship and property ownership for many years; this situation was documented in reports by human rights organizations.^【10】

The 1989 Fergana events further deepened the Meskhetian Turks’ process of dispersal throughout the 20th century and accelerated their spread across different regions of the Soviet geography. This event also caused the Meskhetian Turks issue to acquire a new international dimension; their legal status, displacement problems, and return demands entered the agendas of post-Soviet states and international organizations.

These developments diversified the community’s settlement geography in subsequent years, laying the foundation for a broad diaspora extending to many countries including Russia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and the United States.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the beginning of a new era for the Meskhetian Turks, but rather than resolving previous problems, it further complicated their legal status. During this period, as post-Soviet states redefined their identity, citizenship, and land policies, the Meskhetian Turks were not recognized as “indigenous populations” in most of the countries where they lived; this deepened the discrimination they faced.

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan saw the Meskhetian Turks form relatively stable communities, but the effects of the Fergana events persisted for years, prompting a portion of the community to seek new settlement areas. The post-Soviet economic transformation, the collapse of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz systems, and the shrinking labor market accelerated internal and external migration among Meskhetian Turks, particularly among the younger generation in these countries.

The most severe human rights violations in the post-Soviet period occurred in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai. Denied official status, Meskhetian Turks were deprived for many years of fundamental rights such as citizenship, property ownership, legal employment, health insurance, pensions, education, and official marriage. International human rights organizations described this situation as “institutionalized discrimination”; systematic exclusion of Meskhetian Turks by the Krasnodar authorities has been documented in various reports. As a result, a significant portion of the community joined U.S. refugee resettlement programs in the 2000s.^【11】

Azerbaijan became one of the main destinations for Meskhetian Turks fleeing Fergana; the community concentrated in rural areas and established a new social organizational structure. Although the Azerbaijani government pursued relatively positive citizenship policies, economic difficulties and infrastructure problems persisted for years in the settlement process.

Ukraine offered significant settlement opportunities to Meskhetian Turks in regions such as Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk; however, the conflict environment after 2014 forced this community to migrate again. This situation caused the Meskhetian Turks to enter another cycle of security-driven displacement in the post-Soviet period.

From the 2000s onward, the Meskhetian Turks also launched a broader diaspora movement toward Türkiye, the United States, and European countries. In the United States, concentrated settlements emerged in states such as Colorado, Pennsylvania, Idaho, and Kentucky; in Türkiye, the community established new living areas in provinces such as Kars, Erzincan, Bitlis, and Bursa through extended family networks. This process led the Meskhetian Turks to achieve their widest geographic dispersion to date.

Another important dimension of the post-Soviet period is the internationalization of the community’s identity struggle. International organizations such as the Council of Europe, OSCE, and UNHCR have raised the human rights violations and return demands of the Meskhetian Turks in various reports and negotiations. Nevertheless, Georgia’s reluctance on the return issue and bureaucratic obstacles in practice have prevented the fulfillment of the community’s most fundamental demand for many years.

Since the 1944 deportation, the Meskhetian Turks’ most fundamental demand has been recognition of their right to return to their homeland, the Ahıska region. This demand became more visible after the special resettlement regime was legally abolished in 1956 but remained unanswered for many years due to the resistance of Soviet and Georgian authorities. While significant portions of other deported peoples were granted the right to return, the exclusion of the Meskhetian Turks reinforced a perception of double standards and strengthened the political nature of their struggle for return.

From 1956 onward, the Meskhetian Turks submitted thousands of petitions to Soviet authorities expressing their desire to return to their homeland. However, the Georgian SSR government rejected these demands, arguing that the new demographic order in Ahıska would be disrupted and ethnic tensions would rise. Moscow’s party and state officials supported Georgia’s position and continually delayed the file, turning the right to return into a matter entirely dependent on political will.

During this period, initiatives regarding return demands occasionally evolved into organized campaigns, but no concrete progress was achieved due to the Soviet system’s general security approach and instability in its ethnic policies. By the 1980s, despite being widely dispersed across the Soviet geography, the Meskhetian Turks continued to carry the expectation of return as a core element of their collective identity.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia became a critical actor regarding the Meskhetian Turks’ return demand. As the newly independent state prioritized the construction of national identity and the preservation of territorial integrity, the issue of Meskhetian Turk return remained politically sensitive for a long time.

The civil conflict, political instability, and Abkhazia–South Ossetia crises in the early 1990s caused the return issue to fall behind the agenda. Although the Georgian government expressed general willingness regarding return during this period, it did not develop any institutional mechanism to implement it.

From the mid-1990s onward, the issue of Meskhetian Turk return entered the agenda of international organizations. The Council of Europe evaluated the return of Meskhetian Turks as a key condition during Georgia’s accession process. When Georgia was admitted to the Council of Europe in 1999, it committed to preparing and implementing a comprehensive program for the return of Meskhetian Turks.

This process established the Ahıska issue within an international legal framework for the first time. The Council of Europe and OSCE prepared reports in subsequent years to monitor the implementation of the process, but Georgia’s progress remained very limited.

In line with international commitments, the Georgian Parliament adopted the “Return Law” on 2007. This law presented a fundamental regulation granting Meskhetian Turks the right to apply for Georgian citizenship and resettle in the country. However, its implementation created serious legal and administrative problems:

• The application process was complex and multi-staged.
• Obtaining required documents was practically impossible for many families due to the deportation.
• Evaluation of applications remained subject to bureaucratic processes lasting years.
• Local authorities in Georgia, particularly in Ahıska, showed reluctance toward resettlement.

International reports have noted that the law failed to fulfill its intended function. Only a limited number of the thousands of families who applied were able to complete the process.^【12】

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defined the return of Meskhetian Turks as a “long-standing case of displacement” and called on Georgia to accelerate the process. OSCE emphasized the importance of resolving the Ahıska issue from a regional security perspective, but these initiatives failed to fundamentally change Georgia’s political stance. The joint assessment of international mechanisms is that progress has remained limited due to lack of political will in Georgia and local resistance.

The migration of Meskhetian Turks to Türkiye has been a continuous but intermittent process since the first half of the 19th century, driven by historical and political reasons. Following the Treaty of Edirne signed after the 1828–1829 Russo-Turkish War, which ceded Ahıska to Russia, a significant portion of the region’s Turkish population migrated to Anatolia, initiating the first major population movement along the Ahıska–Anatolia axis. These migrations continued in waves throughout the late 19th century and early 20th century.

After the 1944 deportation, the majority of Meskhetian Turks were forcibly resettled in Central Asia, but Türkiye did not officially accept them during this period. Nevertheless, the cultural and historical ties between the community and Türkiye kept the desire for migration alive. Although the special resettlement regime was abolished in 1956, Georgia’s refusal to permit return prompted Meskhetian Turks to seek alternative settlement areas, with Türkiye becoming a primary destination.

Türkiye’s formal acceptance of Meskhetian Turks was institutionalized by Law No. 3835 dated 2 July 1992. This regulation enabled Meskhetian Turks to be accepted into Türkiye under the status of “resettled migrants,” and from the 1990s onward, a significant portion of the community began settling in Türkiye. Settled Meskhetian families were primarily placed in provinces such as Bursa, Istanbul, İzmir, Erzincan, and Antalya, and later dispersed to other cities across Türkiye.

^{Meskhetian Turks Migrating to Türkiye (}AA⁾

The 1989 Fergana events marked a critical turning point in the migration of Meskhetian Turks to Türkiye. As a result of these events, approximately 90,000 Meskhetians who were forced to leave Uzbekistan sought refuge in Türkiye; Türkiye managed these influxes during this period within a framework grounded in humanitarian and cultural ties. Meskhetian Turks who settled in Türkiye after the Fergana events quickly adapted due to strong family bonds and solidarity networks that helped preserve the community’s social structure.

Throughout the 2000s, Türkiye continued to accept Meskhetians displaced for various reasons. Some members of the community from Krasnodar Krai, who suffered human rights violations, also migrated to Türkiye; this process was addressed within the framework of bilateral relations and humanitarian responsibility. From 2015 onward, Türkiye implemented more comprehensive resettlement programs for displaced Meskhetian communities, strengthening institutional support mechanisms by encouraging concentrated settlement in specific provinces.

Türkiye continues to welcome Meskhetian Turks seeking to migrate from various countries. Following the Ukraine–Russia war, Meskhetian Turks wishing to migrate to Türkiye were brought from Ukraine in convoys starting in December 2015, under the instructions of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Some of the migrating families were settled in newly constructed TOKİ housing units in four neighborhoods of Üzümlü district in Erzincan. All household items and needs of Meskhetian Turks who arrived from Ukraine with only personal belongings were provided by the Republic of Türkiye.

^{Housing Provided to Meskhetian Turks (}AA⁾

Today, Türkiye has become one of the countries with the largest concentration of Meskhetian Turks. Support has been provided to Meskhetians settled in Türkiye in areas such as citizenship, education, social services, and resettlement; Türkiye has served as an important safe haven for the continuity of Meskhetian culture.

On 12 November 2025, Ziyatdin İsmihanoğlu Kassanov, President of the World Union of Meskhetian Turks (DATÜB), and his delegation visited President Erdoğan. In this meeting, Erdoğan expressed Türkiye’s commitment to the Meskhetian Turks with the following words:

"As you know, we temporarily settled 2,315 Meskhetian Turks seeking international protection from our country in Elazığ. We have resettled 703 of our brothers in the first phase of housing built by TOKİ in Ahlat, Bitlis, and we are rapidly constructing the second phase. Earlier, in accordance with our 2015 decision, we resettled a total of 3,215 of our Meskhetian compatriots affected by the conflict in Ukraine in Erzincan Üzümlü and Bitlis Ahlat. To date, we have granted exceptional citizenship to approximately 170,000 Meskhetian Turks and long-term residence permits to more than 150,000 individuals. We will continue supporting all our brothers in need in other countries through our institutions such as TİKA and the Presidency of Turks Abroad. I want you to know that Türkiye is always with you. May our Lord grant us unity and togetherness forever."^【13】

^{Meeting of Ziyatdin İsmihanoğlu Kassanov with President Erdoğan (}AA⁾

Although the 1944 deportation and subsequent forced displacements caused deep ruptures in the cultural fabric of the Meskhetian Turks, the community has demonstrated remarkable resilience in preserving its identity. Despite being dispersed across different geographies, the most important factor sustaining Meskhetian Turk cultural continuity is the strong community ties based on extended family structures. The family has been the central institution for transmitting language, traditions, and historical memory across generations.

Language, as the foundational pillar of cultural identity, has been preserved even under deportation conditions. Meskhetian Turkish, a dialect belonging to the Oghuz branch of Turkic languages, has evolved over the years through contact with Russian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, and other local languages. Nevertheless, the preservation of Turkish within family communication remains one of the most prominent indicators of cultural continuity.

A significant portion of traditional practices continued even during the deportation years. Weddings, funerals, rituals, and seasonal celebrations functioned as social arenas reinforcing community identity. Despite official restrictions during the Soviet period, religious practices were often maintained within homes or small community groups; Quranic education and religious ceremonies survived in informal forms. This demonstrates how deportation conditions strengthened identity preservation mechanisms.

Social memory is one of the strongest elements sustaining Ahıska identity. The 1944 deportation has been transmitted across generations as a collective trauma through family narratives, oral history, poetry, and laments. This memory has also shaped how the deported community defines its identity.

Diaspora processes have also played a vital role in the reproduction of cultural continuity. In new settlement areas such as the United States, Türkiye, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, community centers, associations, and cultural organizations have preserved identity; wedding traditions, handicrafts, culinary culture, and oral literature have been adapted and sustained under new conditions. These institutions have become mediators connecting generations across different countries. Nevertheless, cultural continuity has also undergone some transformations due to modernization, urbanization, and multilingualism brought by the diaspora. Although language erosion and cultural variation are observed among younger generations, the community has shown remarkable stability in preserving the core elements of its identity. The memory of deportation and the sense of historical belonging continue to be fundamental factors strengthening intergenerational bonds.

One of the most renowned elements of Meskhetian Turk oral culture is the mâni tradition, one of the clearest sources reflecting the social memory of the 1944 deportation and subsequent forced migrations. Due to the limited production of written literature and the community’s continuous mobility throughout history, mâni became both a vehicle of cultural transmission and a space for emotional expression.

The most frequently encountered emotion in mâni is the longing for the homeland and the inner rupture caused by separation.

“Behind the mountains we are

By the rivers we are

Everyone is in their homeland

We are in sorrow for our homeland”^【14】

These verses express the shared sense of deprivation experienced by the community in simple language.

The most prominent symbol in Meskhetian mâni is the mountain motif. Mountains represent both the physical distance between Ahıska and exile and the political and social barriers to return:

“These are high mountains

Their backs are veiled in smoke

We have been deported

Those who see this weep”^【15】

Alongside the mountain motif, ship and bird imagery are central symbols of the deportation theme. The ship is seen in many mâni as a vessel of hope to reach the homeland; sometimes it represents a messenger or a gateway to freedom. The bird is the purest expression of longing and the desire for freedom:

“My homeland is here

Birds sing there

I became a dove

I cannot rest thinking of my homeland”^【16】

Another notable feature in mâni is the frequent mention of place names from Ahıska and Türkiye. These place names serve as memory markers that sustain the deported community’s sense of belonging. For example, names such as Adıgün, Osman Paşa, and Erzurum reflect both historical roots and attachment to the ancestral homeland. This usage demonstrates how Meskhetian Turks perceive themselves as both natives of Ahıska and cultural members of Türkiye.

When examining the thematic range of mâni, it becomes clear that the deportation catastrophe has become a prolonged shared emotion and fate. Resentment, defiance against fate, exile pain, hope, prayer, curse, and the desire to endure are emotional layers that complement each other in mâni. Some mâni carry traces of past oppression, while others prominently express the hope of return:

“The white sheep come

They break through the mountains

If the gates of the homeland open

What will come to my home?”^【17】