China's Mineral Diplomacy in Africa

As the global economy enters the second quarter of the 21st century, it is undergoing a multi-layered transformation centered on technology and security. Rare earth elements, with applications spanning from semiconductors to military technologies and from electric vehicles to space research, have emerged as one of the fundamental elements at the heart of this transformation. In this context, rare earth elements have become a decisive factor not only in economic terms but also in the security strategies of states.

Africa’s rich reserves of rare earth elements have made the continent an indispensable hub. As an indicator of the continent’s reserve wealth, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has calculated that Sub-Saharan Africa could generate at least $2 trillion in potential revenue from rare earth elements alone over the next 25 years. The IMF also notes that with proper management, regional economies could achieve GDP growth of up to 12% over the same period, while the International Energy Agency forecasts that global demand for critical minerals will quadruple by 2040.

Chinais clearly the global leader in rare earth elements in terms of reserves, production and processing capacity. With 44 million tons, China alone holds approximately half of global reserves and maintains a decisive advantage in other stages of the production chain. The country accounts for nearly 60% of global rare earth production and 91% of global processing capacity. This positions China as a monopoly in transforming rare earth elements into high-value products.

China’s intense state support for sectors related to rare earth elements has rapidly expanded its high-tech production capacity despite its abundant reserves, leading domestic demand to surpass local supply. As a result, in 2024 China was forced to import 129,500 tons of rare earth elements worth approximately $1.5 billion. With exports limited to just 17,700 tons during the same period, it is clear that China’s strategy in the rare earth sector is primarily focused on supplying its domestic market.

In addition to its dominance in reserves and technological breakthroughs, China’s logistical control in Africa plays a crucial role in its success in rare earth elements. This logistical dominance is largely enabled by ports and railways under Chinese control. Rare earth elements from Africa are transported via Chinese-controlled railway networks to Chinese-controlled ports and then exported to mainland China for processing.

The most significant pillar of China’s logistical dominance is its port investments. Today, 78 ports in 32 African countries are financed, constructed or operated by Chinese companies. This number equates to approximately one-third of the continent’s port infrastructure. In addition to the strategic access gained through these ports, China earns $13 for every dollar invested in African ports, generating substantial financial returns from these facilities.

China’s extensive influence over African ports is often viewed as part of a broader financing model known as “debt-for-port.” Beijing’s large-scale loans have become the primary source of financing for many African countries, and when these debts cannot be repaid, Chinese companies acquire long-term operational rights. Considering that 11 of the 20 countries with the largest debts to China are in Africa, it is likely that the “debt-for-port” strategy will yield more examples across the continent in the coming period.

In addition to port operations, China is expanding its influence in Africa through railway investments. Among China’s most prominent railway projects in Africa are those connecting Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa to the Port of Djibouti and those linking Burundi to Dar es Salaam Port in Tanzania. These projects are regarded as the most concrete examples of China’s strategy to integrate rare earth elements into its supply chain by connecting mining sites under its control to ocean-accessible ports.

In addition to these railway projects, China has undertaken a $1.4 billion agreement to modernize the 1,860-kilometer TAZARA line from Zambia to Dar es Salaam Port in Tanzania. In exchange for modernizing this railway, which is planned to play a key role in the supply of copper, lithium and cobalt, China has secured a 30-year operational right. This line is regarded as a vital link in China’s comprehensive supply chain architecture connecting African mining sites to coastal ports.

The countries directly affected by China’s TAZARA modernization—Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania and Zambia—are also prominent for controlling 86% of the continent’s copper trade. Looking at the broader picture, 56% of Africa’s rare earth elements are exported to China, while the European Union’s share is only 14%. The United States currently plays a negligible role in this equation but is pursuing new initiatives to secure supply and offer African countries alternatives to China.

Among the United States’ initiatives in Africa for rare earth elements, the Lobito Corridor stands out. Like the TAZARA line, this corridor is planned to originate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia but aims to connect to the Port of Lobito in Angola in West Africa for maritime trade. The United States’ 95% dependence on imports for rare earth elements and the fact that 32 of the 50 minerals deemed critical for national security by the U.S. Geological Survey are found in Africa underscore the importance of this initiative.

Similarly, the European Union’s €300 billion Global Gateway Initiative and Japan’s Nacala Corridor Initiative aim to break China’s dominance in the rare earth supply chain. However, when compared to China’s initiatives, the efforts of the United States, the European Union and Japan remain limited and are still in their early stages. This highlights the difficulty of countering Beijing’s supply chain advantage in the short term.

China integrates its logistical advantage with mining projects across Africa. Many large-scale mining operations on the continent are financed through resource-backed credit models, in which African governments pledge mineral revenues as collateral for loans from China. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo secures loans from China by pledging cobalt, Ghana by pledging bauxite, and Angola by pledging oil. This financing model provides China with a permanent foothold in mining sites and regional trade networks.

China applies a similar strategy to gain access to rare earth elements in Africa. As seen in Tanzania’s Ngualla project, long-term offtake agreements by Chinese companies—backed by infrastructure financing from the Export-Import Bank—create an effective control over the rare earth supply chain even before production begins. Although less visible than resource-backed loans, this model enables China to direct the entire process from extraction to processing, integrating African rare earth elements into its global value chain.

The global market value of rare earth elements has risen from $53 billion to $378 billion over the past two decades. Yet African countries capture only 40% of the potential revenue from this massive market. In recent years, African nations have implemented policy changes to protect their economic interests. For instance, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ghana have banned the export of unprocessed lithium, mandating that processing facilities be established within their borders.

The African Mining Vision, published by the African Union, aims for the continent to move beyond being merely a raw material exporter and become a regional economic power capable of processing minerals, driving technological transformation and retaining the majority of value within its borders. This vision clearly reflects African states’ desire to assert greater strategic autonomy over their mineral resources. It also constitutes a structural policy response to the long-standing “resource curse” problem affecting the continent.

Africa’s new direction is increasingly clashing with China’s supply chain architecture. Beijing’s model—based on infrastructure financing, long-term offtake agreements and port-railway networks—is designed to channel African minerals into the global system at the earliest possible stage and in their unprocessed form. In contrast, the African Mining Vision seeks to limit raw material exports and localize processing to ensure that value creation remains within the continent.

Therefore, Africa’s efforts to deepen its mining sector—especially in rare earth elements—are directly at odds with China’s current supply chain advantage. African countries are thus forced to adopt a more complex strategic position: developing policies aligned with their development goals while balancing the financial and market access opportunities offered by China. This dynamic will determine whether Africa can build its own autonomous value chain, becoming one of the key determinants of global competition in the coming years.

Uncontrolled extraction of rare earth elements in Africa is causing irreversible environmental damage. Intensive lithium mining in Tanzania has contaminated water sources, while unregulated rare earth mining in Mozambique and Madagascar has led to the destruction of agricultural land. This demonstrates that although the energy transition appears “green” from geopolitical and economic perspectives, without proper regulation it can have devastating environmental consequences.

On the other hand, intensive extraction of rare earth elements without regulation has triggered serious social problems in many African countries. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, between 140,000 and 200,000 miners—many of them children—are forced to work in direct contact with toxic waste. Similarly, unregulated gold mining in Nigeria’s Zamfara region has caused lead poisoning that has claimed the lives of 400 to 500 children working in mines.

In environmental policy literature, these affected regions are termed “sacrifice zones.” This concept refers to the concentration of ecological costs required by modern economies in specific geographic areas. As advanced economies rapidly transition to eco-friendly technologies such as electric vehicles, solar panels and wind turbines, the pollution and ecological degradation generated in their production processes accumulate predominantly in regions like Africa, where governance capacity is limited, regulatory frameworks are weak, and environmental oversight is inadequate.

This situation points to a structural dynamic known in literature as “green imperialism.” Developed countries seeking to accelerate their exit from fossil fuels are transforming African territories into high-risk, low-regulation production centers to reduce their own environmental burdens. In this way, the colonial logic of raw material extraction persists in a new form. Therefore, the energy transition can only be truly fair if economic activities in underdeveloped regions are organized in a way that does not reproduce colonial relationships.

In conclusion, Africa occupies a central position in the global economy due to its rare earth elements. China, however, has gone beyond being merely an active player in their extraction and has successfully integrated these elements into its global supply chain through railways, ports and other critical infrastructure. This demonstrates that supply chain dominance in strategic sectors such as rare earth elements is increasingly becoming a decisive factor in international competition. Consequently, China’s logistical and economic dominance over Africa’s resources is set to become one of the most critical factors shaping global power balances in the coming period.