Ministry of Interior during the July 15 Coup Attempt

For approximately half a century, the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization, which has constructed for itself a social and public existence and legitimacy base through so-called religious references and possesses a tightly organized communal structure sociologically, has indoctrinated its members within the framework of absolute loyalty to the system and deemed all moral and legal transgressions by its members permissible in pursuit of its objectives.^【1】

In this context, although the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization presents itself externally as a religious service activity, it is in reality a “network of interests” with political, ideological, and economic aims, and simultaneously a “terrorist organization” whose treacherous character was exposed on July 15.^【2】

FETÖ ranks among Türkiye’s most urgent security threats due to its sui generis structure, its incorporation of numerous socio-economic, socio-political, and socio-psychological elements, its esoteric cult-like nature, the high level of commitment of its members, their transformation into dormant cells through the practice of takiye and use of crypto-elements, their ability to collaborate with other terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence agencies for their own interests, and, in short, their view that any means are permissible to achieve their goals.

In pursuit of their dark objectives, the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, resulted in the tragic martyrdom of 253 of our citizens and injuries to 2,740 others. Thanks to the unified, resolute, and heroic stance of all our institutions, especially our citizens, the treacherous coup attempt was successfully repelled.

It is extremely difficult to fully and accurately uncover the history of an organization like FETÖ, which operates through secrecy and takiye. Under the leadership of Fethullah Gülen, the structure was referred to until the end of 2013 by expressions such as “Cemaat,” “Gülen Cemaat,” “Fethullah Gülen Cemaat,” “Fethullahist Structure,” “Fethullah Gülen Organization,” “Camia,” “Service Movement,” and “Volunteers Movement.” After the judicial coup attempt of December 17–25, 2013, directed against the elected government, more accurate analytical and technical terms—“Parallel State Structure (PDY)” and “Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ)”—began to be used to describe the organization’s essence, objectives, characteristics, and actions.^【3】

Although the ideological and intellectual foundations of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization were laid by its leader Fethullah Gülen in the second half of the 1960s, Gülen remained active within the New Asia Group until the 1970s, during which time, while serving in İzmir, he formed the core cadre of the organization by gathering individuals around him and exploiting religious symbols.^【4】

Organization leader Gülen initially focused his activities on students and youth, and over time, through sympathizers he influenced, he activated the organization bearing his name. This so-called leader, who presented his Islamic ideas as spreading to society and adapted himself according to prevailing conditions, enhanced his organization’s influence within the triangle of religion, politics, and money, expanded its reach, and impacted various religious circles. Beginning in the 1990s, the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization expanded beyond Türkiye’s borders and, through rapid growth, began operating in 160 countries.^【5】

From its emergence in the 1970s until 2010, the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization pursued a policy of distancing itself from politics, adopting as its fundamental principle the maintenance of balanced relations with the state and political authorities without opposing them.^【6】

For a long time, the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization presented itself as particularly “indigenous” and “conservative.” However, at critical turning points such as the Mavi Marmara raid, the closure of private tutoring centers, and the summons of MİT Director Hakan Fidan for questioning after 2010, it entered into alliances with groups that could be described as diametrically opposed. The second half of 2013 (Gezi Park protests and the December 17–25 coup attempt) and early 2014 marked the period when the voices of FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization members were most strongly heard on the path leading to the July 15, 2016 uprising.^【7】

The organization’s strategy to overthrow the elected and legitimate authority by unlawful means first became evident following the attempt on February 7, 2012, to summon the MİT Director and former Director and Deputy Director to the Istanbul Special Authorized Public Prosecutor’s Office as suspects. This initiative, which involved infiltration into the judiciary and police, constituted the first illegal move by FETÖ-affiliated structures against the elected will. Subsequently, in May 2013, FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization members became centrally involved in the Gezi Park protests; it was revealed that the tent-burning incident that triggered the demonstrations and the police order to use violence were carried out by FETÖ/PDY elements within the police force.^【8】

Moreover, the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization sought to strike at politics by combining unrelated files in December 2013 and presenting them to public opinion as “corruption.” The December 17–25 coup attempt was initiated through anonymous tip letters, investigations opened based on anonymous tips, and these tips used as evidence—all of which are criminal under the law. Nevertheless, FETÖ-affiliated prosecutors, following orders received, issued operational directives.^【9】

Unable to achieve its objectives through these attempts, the terrorist organization launched a larger-scale betrayal against the state and the nation, implementing a military coup plan through its infiltrated members within the Turkish Armed Forces. The coup attempt orchestrated by the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization across Türkiye on July 15, 2016, was thwarted thanks to the heroic resistance of security forces and our citizens. As a result of the coup attempt, 253 of our citizens, including members of our security forces, were martyred and 2,740 citizens were injured.^【10】

FETÖ is an organization that seeks to establish a new political, economic, and social order unrelated to the Islamic faith by exploiting religion. FETÖ instrumentalizes religious discourse and, through organized presence in fields such as education, media, finance, and bureaucracy, infiltrated various segments of society, engaging in numerous criminal activities including coercion, blackmail, threats, assassinations, entrapment, espionage, money laundering, and infiltration of public institutions. Through the treacherous coup attempt on July 15, 2016, it launched a direct and open attack on our nation’s sovereignty and democracy.^【11】

To prevent the exposure of its organizational structure and to complicate the state’s efforts to dismantle it, FETÖ organized itself not only vertically but also horizontally in cell-like units. Cells typically consist of no more than five individuals and are subordinate to a senior member. Additionally, each cell leader is also a member of another cell.^【12】

The organization led by Fethullah Gülen, who is regarded by FETÖ/PDY members as the “Imam of the Universe” and the “Mahdi,” is structured and spread across the country through a hierarchy of “Imams”: Advisory Corps, Continental Imams, National Imams, Regional Imams, Provincial Imams, District Imams, Merchant Imams, Neighborhood Imams, and Home Imams. In addition to the officials responsible for continents, countries, regions, cities, districts, neighborhoods, and light houses, the organization appoints individuals designated as “Imams” to lead each institution operating in the public sector (ministries and peripheral agencies, local administrations, universities, public economic enterprises) and the private sector (law firms, information technology companies, accounting firms, etc.), bypassing the institutional hierarchy. While these institutional imams are generally appointed from outside the institution, each institution may also have its own internal imams who are accountable to the institutional Imam. Imams operating within the Ministry of Interior, Police, Turkish Armed Forces, MİT, and Judiciary form a separate structure; due to their roles in sensitive state institutions, they take greater precautions than other organization members to avoid surveillance and use technological communication tools in a controlled manner.^【13】

FETÖ ranks at the top of Türkiye’s most urgent security concerns, perhaps foremost due to its sui generis nature. While all terrorist organizations constitute a security threat, FETÖ has become the greatest and most significant danger due to its incorporation of numerous socio-security, socio-economic, socio-political, and socio-psychological elements, its esoteric cult-like structure, the high level of commitment of its members, their transformation into dormant cells through takiye and crypto-elements, their ability to collaborate with other terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence agencies for their own interests, and their belief that any means are permissible to achieve their goals.^【14】

During the coup attempt that began on the night of July 15, FETÖ-affiliated armed terrorists within the Turkish Armed Forces used F-16 fighter jets and attack helicopters to carry out armed and explosive attacks on the Presidential Complex, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, the Police Special Operations Directorate building, the Ankara Police Headquarters, the National Intelligence Organization campus, the TÜRKSAT satellite communication building providing television, radio, and internet broadcasts, the Gendarmerie General Command headquarters, and various military units and civilian areas.^【15】

According to the overarching indictment prepared regarding the July 15 coup attempt, 35 aircraft, 37 helicopters, and 74 tanks were used on the night of the coup; more than 8,000 individuals dressed in military uniforms participated in the coup attempt, along with 246 armored vehicles and over 4,000 weapons (Alpar, 2017: 61). As a result of the unified and heroic resistance shown by security forces and our citizens against the July 15 coup attempt, tragically 253 of our citizens were martyred and 2,740 citizens were injured.

As awareness grew regarding the dark nature of FETÖ after the December 17–25, 2013 events, efforts to combat it accelerated. At the National Security Council meeting on February 26, 2014, FETÖ was defined as a national security threat, and at the National Security Council meeting on May 26, 2016, it was officially recognized as a terrorist organization.^【16】

Before July 15, in the fight against FETÖ, judicial proceedings were initiated alongside certain administrative measures. In this context, some FETÖ-affiliated personnel in critical institutions were removed from their posts, others were retired, some had their public service ties severed, and others were reassigned to passive duties. For example, before July 15, 1,394 FETÖ-suspected personnel in the General Directorate of Security were officially retired, and the Police Academy, Police Colleges, and Police Schools, where FETÖ had established its cadres, were closed to prevent the organization’s infiltration into the Security Organization.^【17】

Immediately after the suppression of the July 15 coup attempt carried out by FETÖ, state cleansing operations against FETÖ were implemented without delay, revealing that the terrorist organization had infiltrated nearly every state unit and established its own hierarchical structure within them. Under the State of Emergency Law, institutions directly affiliated with or linked to the organization—including schools, foundations, associations, and media outlets—were shut down, and investigations were opened against FETÖ members serving in state institutions, resulting in the removal of a significant number of organization members from public office.^【18】

Immediately after the suppression of the July 15, 2016 coup attempt orchestrated by FETÖ, the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President of the Republic, declared a State of Emergency on July 21, 2016, and implemented numerous legal and regulatory changes across many areas.^【19】

Through the emergency decrees issued after July 15, vital steps were taken toward the democratic transformation of civil-military relations. The Chief of the General Staff and force commanders were placed directly under the Ministry of National Defense. The authority of the Ministry of National Defense over military appointments, promotions, and assignments was strengthened; significant powers were transferred to the elected government regarding the structure, principles, and decisions of the National Security Council. The structure of the National Security Council was civilianized, and military courts were abolished. Military schools were closed and the National Defense University was established. The civilianization of the National Defense University’s administration and similar reforms were regarded as important steps toward building a democratic mindset among the military. Additionally, the practice of including military personnel as members in institutions such as RTÜK, TRT, and YÖK was discontinued.^【20】

Under the State of Emergency decrees issued after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, 131,922 administrative measures were implemented. In this context, 125,678 individuals were removed from public service, 3,213 individuals had their ranks revoked, 2,761 institutions and organizations were closed, and the student status of 270 individuals studying abroad was terminated.^【21】

On the night of the treacherous coup attempt, the Ministry of Interior and its central and peripheral organizations demonstrated a resolute stance. Indeed, its affiliated institutions actively resisted the coup. In this context, strategic decisions were implemented, including coordination among the 81 provincial governorships and blocking access to elements posing a threat to the capital.

Additionally, following President Erdoğan’s call to our citizens to defend our democracy, Democracy Watches were actively maintained across all 81 provinces under the coordination of provincial governors and the leadership of civil administration officials.^【22】

All state institutions demonstrated an effective and resolute stance in the fight against FETÖ. In this context, under the State of Emergency, 65,062 personnel within institutions under the Ministry of Interior were subjected to measures, of whom 51,051 were dismissed from public service and 11,713 were removed from their duties. In the fight against FETÖ, 622 MİAH, 636 GİH, 37,602 EGM, 9,070 Gendarmerie, 700 SGK, 110 AFAD, 77 Migration, and 2,204 local administration personnel were dismissed, while 57 MİAH, 262 GİH, 9,161 EGM, 2,054 Gendarmerie, 106 SGK, 58 AFAD, and 15 Migration personnel were removed from their duties.

Simultaneously, within the framework of the rule of law and the requirements of a legal state, judicial and administrative investigations resulted in the reinstatement of 5,475 dismissed personnel who proved their innocence, and 11,444 personnel previously removed from duty were returned to their positions. As a result of these judicial and administrative processes, 10.7% of those dismissed were reinstated, while 97.7% of those removed from duty were returned to their positions.^【23】

One of the administrative activities carried out by the Ministry of Interior in its fight against FETÖ was the adoption of Law No. 7068 on the Decree-Law on Disciplinary Provisions for General Security Forces, aimed at ensuring uniformity among security units. Enacted in 2018, this law regulates misconduct and penalties concerning personnel of the General Directorate of Security, Gendarmerie General Command, and Coast Guard Command, as well as disciplinary authorities and commissions, disciplinary investigation procedures, and other related matters.^【24】

Similarly, through Decree-Law No. 668 issued in 2016, the Gendarmerie’s subordination to the General Staff was terminated, ending its status as part of the Turkish Armed Forces and transforming it into a direct general security force under the Ministry of Interior, thereby placing it on equal footing with other security organizations under the Ministry. Likewise, the Coast Guard Command was restructured as an armed general security force and placed under the Ministry of Interior.^【25】 Similarly, the Coast Guard Command was restructured as an armed general security force and placed under the Ministry of Interior.^【26】

One of the most important factors in the failure of the July 15 coup attempt is the negative public attitudes toward coups embedded in societal memory. Since the 1960s, each military coup has produced direct negative consequences for various segments of society, fostering societal unity against coups.^【27】 In this context, Turkish society demonstrated a determined and heroic stance against the coup attempt and effectively rewrote the epic of Turkish democracy.

Other factors contributing to the successful repulsion of the July 15 coup attempt include: political will resisting the coup, the judiciary taking a stance against the coup, the Security Organization engaging in armed resistance against the coup plotters, the media adopting a pro-democracy and anti-coup position, and resistance within the Turkish Armed Forces.^【28】

In conclusion, the successful repulsion of the July 15 coup attempt has led to an increased societal awareness against coups, strengthening societal cohesion around shared values, while simultaneously enhancing the democratic political culture and preventing further interventions by establishing the path for reforms.