#4 Unmanned

In 2023, the Pentagon launched the “Replicator” initiative with the goal of rapidly integrating thousands of low-cost autonomous systems—such as drones and similar platforms—into its inventory within just 18 to 24 months by leveraging artificial intelligence robotics and commercial technologies. This move arose from the need to counter China’s numerical superiority in ships missiles and personnel by deploying large numbers of small intelligent and inexpensive platforms. Traditionally the U.S. military relied on a small number of highly advanced and expensive systems; the Replicator initiative aimed to establish a new battlefield balance by supplementing these with swarms of unmanned vehicles that were easier to produce and whose loss was acceptable.

The first phase of the Replicator program Replicator 1 focused on the rapid fielding of large numbers of autonomous systems across all branches of the military. Indeed during this period thousands of unmanned systems were planned for deployment across land air and sea domains. The second phase Replicator 2 emerged in response to an evolving threat environment. As the threat posed by small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) became increasingly prominent in recent years the Replicator initiative shifted its focus specifically toward addressing this challenge.

Replicator 2 which became operational in 2025 aims to strengthen defenses against threats posed by small drones. This shift in focus is no coincidence. In late 2023 unauthorized commercial drone flights were detected over Langley-Eustis joint base in Virginia followed by similar violations near military facilities in Utah Ohio Germany and even the United Kingdom. These incidents demonstrated that low-cost unmanned systems could create serious vulnerabilities in military security. In the aftermath of these surprise drone incursions members of Congress began asking the Pentagon “Are our bases within the country defenseless against these cheap drones?” In response to these concerns Replicator 2 was shaped to focus on neutralizing small sUAS threats through rapid and innovative methods. The program treats drones of Group 1 and Group 2 classes—commonly seen in conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East—as an escalating risk. Thus Replicator 2 aims to ensure that the U.S. military is prepared to counter these threats both domestically and at overseas bases.

Strategically Replicator 2 adopts a fast and flexible model distinct from traditional defense procurement methods. The Joint Interagency Task Force 401 JIATF 401 established to execute the program operates with a startup mentality focused on delivering required technologies to the field as quickly as possible. The task force operates on the principle of “buy a few systems quickly test them in the field gather user feedback and scale what works.” For example small-scale purchases are initially made to test various counter-drone solutions at different bases after which decisions are made on which systems to deploy at scale based on these experiences. An innovative component of this approach is the concept of an “Online Counter-Drone Systems Marketplace.” The Pentagon is designing this platform—which is scheduled to go live by March 2026—as a kind of Amazon-style shopping and evaluation site. Just as consumers on an e-commerce platform read product reviews before making decisions base commanders will be able to view user feedback and performance ratings for counter-drone systems tested by other units and rapidly procure the most suitable system for their needs. This enables the sharing of experiences across different U.S. military installations with the goal of accelerating the widespread adoption of effective solutions.

In December 2025 JIATF 401 placed the first procurement under the Replicator 2 program ordering two DroneHunter F700 systems. Fortem Technologies officials stated that the DroneHunter system is already successfully deployed worldwide to protect critical infrastructure and security forces indicating that it has moved beyond the conceptual stage and is a mature solution. Although only two units were initially acquired this small purchase is seen as symbolically significant. Pentagon officials stated that this first system selected under Replicator 2 could serve as a reference point for future large-scale deployments and enable rapid scaling as needs evolve.

The Pentagon views the rapid procurement of systems like DroneHunter as a critical step in an accelerated strategy to protect military bases and critical infrastructure. Indeed the first DroneHunter F700 units are planned to be deployed at two designated U.S. bases by April 2026 with the aim of swiftly closing identified security gaps.

Satellite terminals used by the Ukrainian military on the battlefield play a vital role by enabling high-speed internet connectivity. In January 2026 for the first time it was detected that a similar system was being used on a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle. Analysis of the wreckage of a downed BM-35 type Russian kamikaze drone revealed the presence of a satellite communication terminal similar to Starlink.

During the technical examination of the BM-35 drone which was shot down before reaching its target by Ukrainian air defenses it was determined that a satellite antenna from SpaceX’s Starlink system had been adapted onto its airframe. The terminal was reported to be integrated into the drone’s structure in a way that ensured uninterrupted signal reception throughout flight. The BM-35 is one of Russia’s long-range kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles. Normally guided by radio control or pre-programmed routes these platforms can now operate effectively over much wider areas and despite electronic interference thanks to satellite connectivity.

Satellite-based communication enables a highly stable and low-latency link between the drone and its ground controller. Commands and real-time video transmission can occur without interruption thanks to the Starlink terminal. The encryption of signals via satellite largely neutralizes the effects of enemy electronic warfare systems. Experts note that such satellite-controlled drones are nearly immune to electronic jamming and can strike their targets with high accuracy under the control of operators located at great distances. This means Russian unmanned systems can maintain command and control even within electronic warfare environments.

Another key advantage of satellite control is the significant expansion of the drone’s operational range and area of effect. A drone equipped with a Starlink terminal can be controlled from distances far beyond line-of-sight. For example reports indicate that the range of small kamikaze drones like the Molniya type integrated with Starlink systems increased from approximately 50 km to over 230 km. This allows operators to control drones in real time from their own secure territories such as within Russian territory. The high bandwidth provided by satellite connectivity enables the instantaneous transmission of imagery from drone cameras giving operators a major advantage in target identification and tracking. In short satellite communication significantly enhances unmanned systems by improving both range and data transmission quality.

It appears that Russia is using multiple channels to integrate these advanced communication systems into its drones. Although SpaceX has publicly stated that its Starlink service is not active in Russia and that no devices are sold to the country Russia is reportedly obtaining satellite terminals through third countries. It is indicated that Moscow has acquired Starlink-like terminals via shell companies in countries such as the United Arab Emirates Singapore and Malaysia and delivered them to its frontline units and drone manufacturers. The seized BM-35 case demonstrates that Russian engineers have successfully integrated this commercial system into the drone’s airframe. According to experts the terminal was properly installed inside the airframe to ensure uninterrupted operation throughout the flight. Russian sources emphasize that the introduction of Starlink-based control has fundamentally changed the situation by providing drones with extremely stable command and telemetry channels. Following this first BM-35 example it is expected that similar satellite control systems will rapidly spread to other Russian unmanned platforms. Ukrainian military expert Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov stated that Shahed drones (known in Russian inventory as Geran) guided by Starlink could appear on the battlefield within days rather than months. It is also reported that Russia plans to integrate air-to-air missiles into its newly developed Geran-4 unmanned aerial vehicles and deploy them as unmanned interceptor aircraft while also utilizing satellite terminals on these platforms.

The deployment of satellite-controlled drones presents a serious challenge for Ukraine. Until now Ukrainian electronic warfare units have largely been able to neutralize Russian drones by jamming their signals but they now acknowledge that these methods may be far less effective against satellite-linked systems. Satellite control enables a drone to maintain operator command until the final moment of its mission increasing its probability of reaching its target. This signals a new escalation in Moscow’s efforts to bypass Ukraine’s electronic defenses. Indeed recent successful attacks on high-priority Ukrainian targets such as HIMARS rocket launchers have been reported to be carried out using Russian unmanned systems equipped with Starlink terminals. Thanks to uninterrupted and clear video streams from satellites Russian operators have been able to identify real targets instead of decoys thereby increasing the accuracy of these strikes. These developments may compel Ukraine to reassess its air defense and electronic warfare tactics.

The widespread adoption of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) in civilian and commercial applications marks the beginning of a new era in aviation architecture at low altitudes. The system known as UAS Traffic Management (UTM) integrates communication navigation and cloud-based traffic management infrastructure to enable thousands of drones to share the same airspace. However this interconnected structure also brings comprehensive cybersecurity risks to the forefront. A newly published analysis demonstrates that in addition to command-and-control (C2) links the navigation sensor data pathways and cloud access layers of drone and UTM ecosystems contain critical vulnerabilities that threaten flight safety. The study identifies and classifies these risks concretely bringing together existing threat research to support the safe and scalable integration of sUAS.

The primary reason UTM is critically vulnerable from a security standpoint is the heavy reliance of sUAS operations on data connections sensor data and especially navigation systems. The analysis highlights that these infrastructures can be defenseless against cyberattacks such as spoofing jamming hijacking and data manipulation because sUAS are controlled via GPS-based navigation remote ID systems and cloud-based traffic data exchanges creating multiple opportunities for attackers to disrupt or manipulate system behavior.

The existence of these security risks has become a focal point for academic and industrial research. Other assessments on cybersecurity threats and countermeasures also show that the increasing data dependency and expanded attack surface of UTM architectures directly impact system security. Components within UTM such as C2 links telemetry channels and support systems are vulnerable to disruption or deception which could lead to catastrophic consequences for flight safety.

Research further reveals that UTM’s cybersecurity needs go beyond merely identifying threats; they require comprehensive defense strategies to secure data exchanges and communication protocols between the subsystems that make up the UTM architecture. Such studies not only identify current attack surfaces but also push forward the development of next-generation defense techniques including advanced cryptographic solutions authentication mechanisms and anomaly detection systems.

Gaps in data sharing between third-party service providers and aviation authorities in inter-system communications and the integrity of command-and-control links are seen as critically important for the overall safety of the airspace because these gaps could allow a cyber attacker to take control of a drone manipulate mission data or alter system behavior.