National Socialist Underground (NSU)

The National Socialist Underground (NSU) (original name: Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund) is an extreme right-wing terrorist organization held responsible for the murders of ten people between 2000 and 2007 in Germany, eight of whom were of Turkish origin. Its existence and role in the murders were revealed through evidence uncovered after two of its members were found dead on 4 November 2011. Until that date, investigations in different federal states had failed to establish connections between the killings, which were consistently treated as unsolved crimes and largely interpreted within the context of organized crime, the mafia, or drug-related activity. Following the exposure of the case, German security agencies’ investigative procedures, information sharing, and intelligence operations were examined by public opinion and official commissions, sparking intense debate over the failures in uncovering the organization’s connections and activities.

^{Protests Against the NSU (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

The formation of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) is linked to the social and political climate in Germany, where extreme right-wing movements intensified notably after the 1990s. The Berlin Wall’s fall led to the emergence of xenophobic organizations in many cities following the reunification of East and West Germany, with extreme right-wing groups becoming particularly visible in the former East Germany. During this period, various neo-Nazi structures played a role in the rising number of attacks against foreigners and migrants, and migrant communities predominantly of Turkish origin emerged as primary targets. This broader context contributed to the strengthening of radical networks that laid the groundwork for the NSU’s emergence in subsequent years.

The NSU’s core membership consisted of Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Mundlos, and Uwe Böhnhardt. Before the organization became public, this trio operated within the Jena cell of an extreme right-wing group known as Thüringer Heimatschutz. This structure had a rigid hierarchical organization, and the NSU developed within this same hierarchical model. The local Jena network was part of a broader neo-Nazi network in Germany and provided the ideological and organizational foundation for the NSU’s future actions.

In 1998, a police raid on a bomb workshop linked to the trio marked the beginning of their transition underground. After the raid, Zschäpe, Mundlos, and Böhnhardt went into hiding and began a long period of living outside official records. Despite going underground, their names remained known in public circles, and it was later revealed that they maintained connections with various extreme right-wing networks until the organization’s exposure in 2011. After 1998, the group operated across different regions of Germany with the help of identity changes, safe houses, and support from extreme right-wing networks.

In the NSU’s radicalization process, environmental factors were accompanied by a decisive role played by the extreme right-wing network in which the group operated. Particularly from the 1990s onward, the increase in attacks against foreigners in Germany enabled neo-Nazi groups to become more visible. During this period, incidents such as attacks on refugee shelters, arson, and lynching attempts fueled radicalization within extreme right-wing circles and hardened anti-migrant attitudes. This environment provided the ideological framework for the series of murders the NSU would later carry out.

Another notable aspect in discussions about the NSU’s formation is the assessment that the group was not merely a cell of three individuals. Some sources indicate the existence of supporters, informants within extreme right-wing circles, and individuals who aided the organization. Nevertheless, official investigations adopted the position that the NSU consisted solely of the core trio. As a result, it has been noted that broader connections and organizational structures potentially involved in the NSU’s formation were not adequately examined during the investigation.

The NSU’s organizational development is also linked to the difficulties faced by German security agencies in monitoring extreme right-wing structures. It has been assessed that federal and state intelligence agencies operated through the V-Mann system, collecting information from certain neo-Nazi circles, but this system failed to generate effective intelligence in the NSU context or to make existing information public. Various reports have alleged that some individuals close to the NSU were also in contact with intelligence services, and the connections surrounding the organization’s formation were never fully clarified. This situation has been regarded as a factor that hindered a clear understanding of the NSU’s structure and its underlying relationships.

The National Socialist Underground (NSU) terrorist organization carried out a series of murders targeting migrants and one police officer between 2000 and 2007 in various German cities, and also conducted bombings and bank robberies. The group’s actions remained unsolved for many years; connections between the attacks were only established after the NSU’s exposure in 2011. One common feature of the murders during this period was that the majority of victims were Turkish citizens or migrants. Furthermore, the repetitive nature of the NSU’s methods revealed that the attacks were part of a planned and sustained terrorist campaign.

The NSU’s first murder occurred on 9 September 2000 in Nuremberg. Enver Şimşek, a German citizen of Turkish origin who earned his living selling flowers, was shot in the head by unidentified attackers while he was in his van selling flowers. This incident is recorded as the beginning of the NSU’s series of murders targeting migrants. At the time, security units focused on the possibility of organized crime connections, but later evidence confirmed the attack was carried out by the organization.

This murder was followed by a second attack on 13 June 2001, also in Nuremberg. Abdürrahim Özüdoğru, who ran a tailor shop, was shot in the head and killed while working in his shop. The method of killing resembled that of the first murder, but police continued to treat it as an isolated incident, focusing investigations on the victim’s family and business relationships. Later evidence, however, confirmed this attack was also planned by the NSU.

The NSU’s third murder was the killing of Süleyman Taşköprü in Hamburg on 27 June 2001. Taşköprü, who ran a vegetable shop with his family, was shot in the head and killed during the attack. Investigations during this period focused on the victim’s business and family connections, but no link was established with earlier attacks in other cities. The fact that the same weapon was used in all murders was not officially recognized until the NSU’s exposure.

The NSU’s fourth victim was Habil Kılıç, killed in Munich on 29 August 2001. Kılıç, who was alone in the family-run vegetable shop, was shot in the head and killed. Although the killing method resembled that of previous attacks, it was again investigated as an isolated incident. Evidence collected at the scene was only later connected to the other murders after the NSU’s exposure in 2011.

The NSU’s fifth murder occurred three years later, on 25 February 2004, in Rostock, with the killing of Mehmet Turgut. Turgut, who worked at a döner kebab shop, was killed during an armed attack. Investigations at the time again focused on the possibility of organized crime, and no connection was drawn to previous murders. However, it was later determined that the weapon used was the same Ceska brand pistol used in earlier attacks.

The NSU’s sixth murder took place on 9 June 2005 in Nuremberg, targeting İsmail Yaşar. Yaşar, who operated a döner kebab stall, was shot in the head and chest and killed. This attack shared similarities with earlier murders in the same city and was still treated as unsolved at the time.

One week later, on 15 June 2005, in Munich, Greek-origin German citizen Theodoros Boulgarides was killed. Boulgarides, who worked as a locksmith, was shot twice in the head while at his shop.

In Dortmund, Mehmet Kubaşık, who ran a snack bar, was killed by the NSU on 4 April 2006. His murder in his shop demonstrated the continuity of attacks across different cities and the mobile nature of the organization. Investigations after the incident again focused on the victim’s family and business connections, and the link to other murders was not officially recognized.

The NSU’s ninth victim was Halit Yozgat, killed in Kassel on 6 April 2006. Yozgat, who ran an internet café, was shot in the head and killed. The presence of an intelligence officer at the crime scene during the murder sparked public debate, but the official investigation file long failed to establish an organizational link.

The NSU’s known final murder occurred on 25 April 2007 in Heilbronn, targeting police officer Michèle Kiesewetter. The 21-year-old Kiesewetter and another police officer were attacked during a patrol; Kiesewetter was killed, and the other officer seriously injured. This attack drew attention because, unlike previous murders, it targeted police officers rather than migrants. However, the motive and the organization’s criteria for selecting targets were never fully clarified.

^{Beate Zschäpe from the NSU Core Trio (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

In addition to the series of murders, the NSU’s activities included bomb attacks. Sources indicate that the organization carried out at least two bomb attacks from the early 2000s. One of the most well-known was the bombing on 9 June 2004 in a street in Cologne where Turkish communities were concentrated. The attack injured 22 people, but security agencies at the time did not classify it as a xenophobic terrorist act. Another attack occurred on 19 January 2001, when a bomb was detonated at a market owned by an Iranian. For years, investigations treated the attack as organized crime or intergroup conflict, and the NSU connection was not raised until the organization’s exposure in 2011.

The NSU never claimed responsibility for the bombings, and no direct evidence linking the attacks to the organization was found at the scenes, which contributed to the attacks remaining unsolved for years. Moreover, police and intelligence agencies failed to assess possible ideological links between the attacks during their investigations, instead focusing investigations on local conflicts and criminal ties. The NSU’s bomb attacks are significant because they demonstrate that the organization was not only capable of targeted killings but also possessed the capacity to inflict mass damage as a terrorist structure.

A significant part of the NSU’s activities involved bank robberies carried out to finance its operations. Sources indicate that between 2000 and 2011, the organization carried out at least 15 bank robberies. These actions enabled the group to meet its logistical needs and finance operational elements such as weapons and shelter during its time underground. The robberies were generally carried out using armed methods, and some employees and civilians were injured during the attacks. Nevertheless, the NSU never claimed responsibility for these robberies, and the crimes were long treated as isolated criminal incidents.

The fact that the robberies occurred across different federal states over a long time period demonstrates the organization’s mobile and systematic operations. Security agencies failed to connect these robberies with the series of murders until the NSU’s identity was revealed. The incidents were mostly evaluated as ordinary criminal activity. It has become clear that the NSU’s bank robberies were one of the main pillars of the financial infrastructure that enabled the organization to sustain its activities for many years. This reveals that the NSU’s financing structure was integrated and continuous with its operational practices.

During the investigation of the murders, attacks, and robberies, jurisdictional limitations among state police forces prevented the connection between the crimes from being recognized for years. Each state investigated crimes within its own borders independently, but the fact that the same weapon was used in murders across different states was not officially consolidated for a long time. This situation created the conditions for the NSU to operate undetected for many years and led to growing criticism of the investigations.

The exposure of the NSU’s activities became possible on 4 November 2011, when the terrorists Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt were found dead in a caravan. Shortly after this incident, Beate Zschäpe set fire to the NSU’s safe house, and in the ruins, investigators recovered video recordings in which the NSU claimed responsibility for the murders, along with the weapons used. This discovery revealed that the ten murders committed between 2000 and 2007, mostly targeting Turkish citizens, were linked and planned by the same organization.

In this context, the NSU’s murders and attacks demonstrate that the organization systematically targeted migrants over a long period, operated through a mobile and concealment-based structure, and that federal security agencies failed to establish connections between the incidents. Post-exposure investigations have shown that the attacks were part of a multidimensional and planned terrorist strategy.

^{Beate Zschäpe in Court (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

• Enver Şimşek: A German citizen of Turkish origin living in Nuremberg who earned his living selling flowers. On 9 September 2000, he was seriously wounded in an armed attack by NSU members while selling flowers in his minibus and died in hospital on 11 September.

• Abdürrahim Özüdoğru: A German citizen of Turkish origin residing in Nuremberg. He was killed on 13 June 2001 during an armed attack by NSU members while working in his tailor shop.

• Süleyman Taşköprü: A German citizen of Turkish origin living in Hamburg. He was killed on 27 June 2001 during an armed attack by NSU members in the vegetable shop he operated.

• Habil Kılıç: A 38-year-old German citizen of Turkish origin living in Munich. On 29 August 2001, he was shot in the head and killed while alone in the family-run vegetable shop during an NSU attack.

• Mehmet Turgut: A 27-year-old German citizen of Turkish origin living in Rostock. He was killed on 25 February 2004 when shot in the head by NSU members while working at his döner kebab shop.

• İsmail Yaşar: A German citizen of Turkish origin who operated a döner kebab stall in Nuremberg. He was killed at age 50 on 9 June 2005 after being shot in the head and chest during an NSU attack.

• Theodoros Boulgarides: A 41-year-old German citizen of Greek origin living in Munich. He was killed on 15 June 2005 when shot twice in the head by NSU members while working at his locksmith shop.

• Mehmet Kubaşık: A 39-year-old German citizen of Turkish origin who operated a snack bar in Dortmund. He was killed by NSU members on 4 April 2006.

• Halit Yozgat: A 21-year-old German citizen of Turkish origin who operated an internet café in Kassel. He was killed on 6 April 2006 when shot twice in the head by NSU members.

• Michèle Kiesewetter: A 21-year-old German police officer serving in Heilbronn. She was killed on 25 April 2007 during an armed attack carried out by NSU members.

^{Protests Against the NSU (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

The existence of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) became publicly known for the first time on 4 November 2011. After a bank robbery in Eisenach, eastern Germany, police located the getaway vehicle and discovered the bodies of Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt inside. Official statements claimed that the two members had committed suicide inside the caravan. This event provided the first concrete indication that the series of murders targeting migrants over many years might have been carried out by an organized terrorist structure.

Shortly after the deaths in the caravan, the NSU’s third member, Beate Zschäpe, set fire to the group’s safe house in Zwickau. After firefighters responded, video recordings confirming the NSU’s responsibility for the murders and the Ceska CZ 83 pistol used in the series of murders were recovered from the ruins. These findings revealed that the ten killings between 2000 and 2007, mostly involving Turkish citizens, were interconnected and planned by the same organization. Zschäpe surrendered to police four days after the fire, and the investigation rapidly expanded.

The exposure of the organization triggered debates over the failure of German security agencies’ investigations over many years. Sources indicate that during the period of the murders, police and prosecution authorities failed to connect the incidents and largely linked the attacks to the victims’ immediate circles or organized crime structures. For example, despite the use of the same weapon in all the serial murders, this information was not effectively shared among investigation units in different states, and therefore no assessment was made that a single perpetrator was responsible. This situation has been viewed as one of the factors enabling the NSU to operate undetected for nearly a decade.

^{NSU Terrorist Organization Infographic (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

The murders committed by the NSU between 2000 and 2007 were long treated by German security agencies as unrelated incidents. Although the attacks across different states showed similarities in their methods, weapons used, and profiles of the victims, police and prosecution authorities failed to establish connections between them, and investigations were largely focused on the victims’ families, business circles, or organized crime structures. It has been noted that in some cases, families of Turkish-origin victims were even treated as suspects, and misdirected investigations further increased their suffering.

One of the most important reasons for the independent conduct of investigations was the federal structure of Germany, which limited state police forces’ investigative authority to their own state boundaries. As a result, no comprehensive assessment was possible for attacks occurring in different cities such as Nuremberg, Munich, Kassel, Dortmund, and Hamburg, and the fact that the same Ceska CZ 83 pistol was used in all murders was not considered in the early stages of the investigation. Some sources indicate that the inability to connect the attacks enabled the NSU to operate for approximately a decade.

A significant dimension of criticism directed at the investigations concerns the alleged “institutional bias” within security agencies and the failure to take the threat of extreme right-wing violence seriously. In the early 2000s, police units persistently investigated the murders within the framework of organized crime, drug trafficking, or family disputes, and the possibility of an extreme right-wing wave of violence targeting migrants was not seriously considered for a long time. Official documents indicate that although warnings were issued about the possible racist motivation behind the murders, this possibility was not effectively pursued. This situation contributed to the delayed progress of the NSU investigation and eroded public trust in state institutions among the victims’ families.

Immediately after the NSU’s exposure, the destruction of certain files within intelligence agencies sparked serious debates regarding the integrity of the investigations. Allegations that documents related to neo-Nazi networks close to the NSU were deleted in Thuringia and other states became central to federal and state-level criticism. Reports indicate that these files contained information that could have clarified the NSU’s connections, but their destruction negatively impacted the investigation.

Criticism of the NSU investigations extends beyond operational shortcomings of security agencies to highlight structural problems within state institutions. Discussions about the presence of extreme right-wing sympathies or institutional bias within certain public agencies have been regarded as a major factor that hindered the detection of the NSU’s activities. In this context, delays in the investigations have been described as stemming not merely from technical errors but from systemic and perceptual flaws. Additionally, criticism has been raised regarding the limited capacity of federal and state intelligence agencies to analyze radicalization processes within extreme right-wing networks. After 9/11, security policies focused heavily on other threats, leading to insufficient monitoring of extreme right-wing activities, which proved decisive in the NSU remaining undetected for years.

^{NSU Terrorist Organization Infographic (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

The judicial process following the exposure of the NSU has been regarded as one of the most comprehensive terrorism trials in Germany’s recent history. After the organization’s existence was confirmed in 2011, investigations led to charges against Beate Zschäpe, the core member, and other defendants accused of aiding the NSU. The trial began on 6 May 2013 in the 6th Criminal Chamber of the Munich Higher Regional Court and was conducted under intense security measures. Public interest in the trial was extremely high, and numerous journalists, lawyers, and civil society representatives followed the proceedings until their conclusion.

The court also tried four other defendants accused of assisting the NSU’s activities. Among them, Ralf Wohlleben faced charges of helping procure the weapons used in the murders; André Eminger was accused of providing logistical support. Holger Gerlach was tried for supplying false identities to NSU members, and Carsten Schultze admitted guilt for providing weapons and silencers to the organization. The court thoroughly examined the allegations that these individuals facilitated the NSU’s activities.

The trial consisted of 437 hearings and heard testimony from 765 witnesses and 56 experts. Sources indicate that the trial’s exceptional length resulted from both the volume of evidence and the need to evaluate numerous contradictory statements. Inconsistencies occasionally emerged in witness testimonies, and some suspicious deaths of witnesses attracted public attention. These developments increased the complexity of the trial and expanded debates regarding its connection to security and intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, the court focused on assessing the individual responsibilities of the defendants.

^{Court Where the Trial Was Held (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

The most critical defendant, Beate Zschäpe, as the sole surviving core member of the organization, was charged with complicity in all NSU actions. The prosecution argued that she played an active role in understanding the motives of NSU members, selecting targets, and sustaining the attacks. The court found Zschäpe guilty of ten murders, attempted murder of 43 people, two bomb attacks, and fifteen bank robberies, sentencing her to life imprisonment.

Other defendants received the following sentences: Ralf Wohlleben was sentenced to twelve years for aiding in six murders; Carsten Schultze received three years; Holger Gerlach received five years; and André Eminger, assessed as having provided support to the organization, was sentenced to twelve years in prison.

Although the trial concluded with verdicts on 11 July 2018, the legal process continued until 2021. The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) rejected appeals filed by Beate Zschäpe and two other convicts on 19 August 2021, upholding the lower court’s rulings. On 15 December 2021, the same court also rejected André Eminger’s appeal, making the 2018 verdict legally final. Thus, the NSU trial was fully closed within the judicial system, and all rulings became enforceable.

Criticism of the trial process did not end with the final verdict. It has been argued that the court failed to adequately investigate whether the NSU had a broader support network and limited its evaluation solely to the core trio. Additionally, the imposition of a 120-year access ban on certain files, and the refusal to fully disclose documents regarding possible contacts between the NSU and state institutions, have sustained public debate.

^{Prison Where NSU Members Were Held (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

Following the exposure of the NSU, the failure of German security and intelligence agencies to detect the organization’s activities for years triggered significant public and commission-led debates. Research commission reports revealed that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) and state-level intelligence units failed to adequately evaluate information gathered from neo-Nazi circles. According to the reports, some individuals used as informants by intelligence agencies were themselves active members of extremist right-wing networks closely linked to the NSU and in positions to access relevant information. Nevertheless, these leads were not used to deepen investigations while the murders continued.

A notable aspect in this context is that some extreme right-wing actors with close ties to the NSU’s core members were also state informants. For example, Ralf Marschner (codename: “Primus”), known as an influential figure in Thuringia’s neo-Nazi networks, was also in contact with intelligence services. Similarly, connections between Marcel Degner (“Hagel”) and Tino Brandt (“Otto”), leaders of the extreme right-wing group Blood & Honour, and intelligence agencies were documented. These individuals were present in the same circles as NSU members, yet these relationships did not contribute to the early detection of the organization’s activities.

One of the most intense debates surrounding the NSU concerns the destruction of certain files in intelligence agencies shortly after the organization’s exposure. In particular, documents in the Thuringia state intelligence unit believed to contain information related to the NSU’s network were deleted, severely hampering the investigation. According to records, a significant portion of intelligence data collected on extreme right-wing groups close to the NSU was destroyed shortly after the organization’s exposure in 2011. This was criticized by both federal and state commissions, which stated that these actions obstructed the clarification of the NSU’s connections.

Another dimension of criticism directed at intelligence agencies concerns the lack of adequate analysis of the scope of the NSU’s activities. Some reports indicate that security agencies prematurely accepted the assessment that the NSU was merely a cell of three individuals and failed to investigate the possibility that it operated within a broader network. The federal prosecution is also assessed to have directed the investigation within this narrow framework and not sufficiently pursued the NSU’s supporters. This approach is argued to have limited the judicial process in questioning the organization’s network and potential support mechanisms.

Some witness deaths during the NSU trial further intensified intelligence-related debates. Sources report that several witnesses linked to the NSU or its neo-Nazi networks died under unusual circumstances. One such case was that of Florian H, whose body was found burned inside his car on the day he was scheduled to give a statement to police. This incident sparked major controversy. Similarly, the suspicious deaths of individuals such as Arthur C. and Melissa M led to public assessments that the investigation had not been conducted transparently. Parliamentary commissions examined these deaths but were unable to establish direct evidence linking them to the organization.

^{Protests Against the NSU (}Anadolu Ajansı⁾

The exposure of the NSU murders and developments during the investigation process created trust issues, particularly among migrant communities in Germany. The long failure to uncover the murders, the focus of investigations on the victims’ families, and the refusal to interpret the events within a racist context significantly weakened the trust of the Turkish community in German state institutions. The Turkish community in Germany began to express concern over why the attacks remained unsolved and how the perpetrators were not identified for years, creating a problematic foundation for coexistence and social integration.

Even after the completion of the NSU trial, these trust issues persist. The failure to fully identify the identities of the NSU’s supporters and collaborators has generated deep dissatisfaction among victims’ families and migrant communities. The court’s imposition of a 120-year access ban on certain files and the exclusion of some documents from public scrutiny have fueled public perceptions in the Turkish community that truths are being concealed. These debates have directly affected social perceptions and state-citizen relations beyond the technical aspects of the legal process.

Following the investigations and trial, political circles have debated the need to reassess the structure of intelligence and security agencies. Reports by parliamentary research commissions have shown that security agencies lacked the capacity to detect and monitor extreme right-wing threats. Findings that intelligence units required reform in areas such as informant networks, data sharing, file management, and operational oversight have become one of the key outcomes of the NSU case. These debates have created a broader political framework questioning the relationship between security agencies and extreme right-wing networks and the state’s approach to such structures.

Assessments indicate that after the NSU’s exposure, there was a decline in the political participation and sense of social belonging among migrant communities in Germany. For example, the targeting of lawyers involved in the NSU trial and the sending of threatening letters signed “NSU 2.0” to some lawyers increased anxiety among lawyers and community representatives of migrant origin.