This article was automatically translated from the original Turkish version.
The Cold War era’s fragile global security was underpinned by the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. However, this doctrine is increasingly losing relevance in the face of today’s technological advancements. Classical deterrence models based on nuclear retaliation are being undermined by the emergence of hypersonic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, while states are signaling a shift toward new and radical solutions to secure their safety. In this context, the rise of comprehensive and layered air defense projects stands out not only as an effort to counter the hypersonic missile threat but also as the most prominent reflection of the evolving global security architecture and emerging security imperatives.
The most striking and ambitious example of this trend is the Golden Dome missile defense project recently announced by U.S. President Donald Trump. The project’s primary objective is to envelop American territory in what amounts to a global shield, providing absolute protection against aerial attacks. While most modern air defense systems today are deployed on land and sea platforms, the Golden Dome project also envisions placing interceptors in space capable of calculating the trajectory of hostile ballistic missiles and destroying them while still in flight. This approach is presented as a radical technological leap and simultaneously viewed as a step toward redefining U.S. defense strategy on a global scale.
Trump’s announced Golden Dome evokes the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as “Star Wars,” launched by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Like Trump’s project, Reagan’s initiative promised to destroy nuclear missiles in flight, but it was shelved due to insufficient technical capacity and astronomical costs. Today, the Golden Dome faces similar uncertainties. Whether such a system can be technologically implemented at this scale remains a subject of debate, and its financial sustainability raises major questions. Indeed, an analysis published in Defense and Peace Economics estimates the project’s total cost could range between $430 billion and $5.3 trillion.
Alongside the U.S., Türkiye is not lagging behind in the transformation of air defense systems and is implementing the Steel Dome project. At the heart of this initiative is the “Hakim” command-and-control platform, which aims to integrate diverse defense systems such as the HİSAR missile family and SİPER under a single umbrella to create a comprehensive defense architecture. Similarly, India has launched a broad air defense initiative called “Mission Sudarshan Chakra,” planning to counter a wide spectrum of threats—from ballistic missiles to small drones—with early warning and interception systems deployed across land, sea, and space. The “European SkyShield Initiative,” jointly pursued by 24 European countries including Türkiye following Russia’s attacks on Ukraine, stands out as the most concrete manifestation of this trend in Europe.
In this context, the evolving understanding of air defense reflects a new global wave of rearmament and strategic realignment. In an era where hypersonic weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles are eroding existing deterrence doctrines, comprehensive air defense projects have become a fundamental security priority for states. Consequently, the question of why comprehensive air defense systems have gained such prominence today is emerging as a critical issue for the future of the international security architecture.
It can be argued that rapid technological advances in hypersonic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles are expanding the threat spectrum and fundamentally transforming defense doctrines. Hypersonic missiles, recently integrated into the inventories of major powers, can reach speeds exceeding Mach 5 (approximately 6,200 km/h), maneuver within the atmosphere, and evade detection by radar systems, making them a formidable challenge for current defenses. Moreover, the combined use of low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles with hypersonic missiles can overwhelm detection and interception capabilities, creating safe “corridors” for these missiles to penetrate.
The growing importance of hypersonic missiles in the defense and offense doctrines of leading states is evident in recent initiatives. Russia’s Avangard and China’s DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicles are already operational. Meanwhile, the U.S. Dark Eagle program is rapidly approaching completion. Although Iran’s Fettah missiles, which have limited maneuverability, remain controversial in terms of whether they truly qualify as “hypersonic,” Israel’s investments in its hypersonic Arrow 3 system are noteworthy. North Korea has also announced it recently tested hypersonic missile systems aimed at countering U.S. presence in the Pacific.
A February 2025 U.S. Congressional Report clearly demonstrates that current defense systems are inadequate for detecting and tracking hypersonic weapons. The report emphasizes that the high speed and maneuverability of hypersonic weapons are pushing the limits of existing radar and missile defense systems. This situation necessitates a reassessment of defense strategies and compels the development of multi-layered, comprehensive air defense architectures. Therefore, the construction of comprehensive air defense systems—comprising next-generation detection technologies, AI-based early warning systems, and layered interception mechanisms—is becoming an increasingly critical security priority.
The most fundamental strategic shift caused by these new weapons is the erosion of the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine, which formed the foundation of Cold War nuclear deterrence. Hypersonic weapons directly threaten a nation’s “second-strike capability”—its ability to retaliate after being attacked—due to their high effectiveness against current air defenses, extraordinary speed, and unpredictable maneuverability. In other words, these weapons carry the potential to neutralize the retaliatory power that underpins nuclear deterrence before it can be deployed. Therefore, states’ pursuit of comprehensive and layered air defense systems like the Golden Dome can be interpreted as a strategy to preserve their second-strike capability against a hypersonic first strike and thereby maintain their nuclear deterrence posture.
On the other hand, this trend also triggers a dangerous arms race. A defense system developed by one side to preserve its retaliatory capability may be perceived by the other as an attempt to neutralize its offensive capacity. This vicious cycle drives parties to continuously develop more advanced offensive and defensive technologies, accelerating the arms race. As a result, competition between hypersonic attack weapons and the comprehensive defense systems designed to counter them is eroding the predictability and strategic stability upon which the Mutual Assured Destruction regime depended, rendering global security more fragile and uncertain.
A continuity can also be observed between Trump’s Golden Dome project and Reagan’s Star Wars Initiative in this regard. Reagan characterized Mutual Assured Destruction as a “suicide pact” during the tense Cold War environment and proposed instead a vision of an absolute security shield that would render nuclear weapons “ineffective and obsolete.” This vision aimed to grant the U.S. strategic superiority by fully protecting it from adversaries’ retaliatory capabilities. However, the program was never implemented, facing objections that it would alienate European allies and destabilize international politics, as well as due to financial and technical constraints—issues that persist in today’s debates over the Golden Dome.
In conclusion, comprehensive air defense projects such as the U.S. Golden Dome Initiative signify far more than mere military modernization. They are the clearest indicators of an era in which hypersonic weapons have fundamentally undermined the nuclear deterrence-based stability of the Cold War. In this context, air defense systems reflect not only the capacity to stop missiles but also the depth of mistrust and strategic imbalance among global powers. Although these systems theoretically aim to restore stability by preserving second-strike capabilities, in practice—as seen with the 1980s Star Wars Initiative—they are perceived by adversaries as threats and carry the potential to fuel a dangerous arms race. Thus, these “domes” stand before us not merely as defensive measures but as the most tangible signs of a new global security era defined by diminished predictability and heightened risk of conflict.
