#18 Gray Area

In recent days, Israel Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991, has been recognized by Israel as a sovereign state within the spirit of the Abraham Accords announced. Behind Israel’s decision to be the first country to recognize Somaliland are economic and political motives, as well as debates surrounding the forced displacement of Gazans.

Somaliland, with a population of approximately six million, possesses its own parliament, security forces, and currency. Its primary value lies in its geostrategic location. Somaliland is situated near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Approximately one-third of global trade passes through this route, making it one of the most vital corridors in global maritime commerce.

In recent years, rising security risks due to pirates in the Red Sea and the Houthis in Yemen have placed this maritime corridor under broad threat, ranging from disruptions to shipping to damage to undersea cables. In this context, Somaliland occupies a critical position not only as a gateway to the heart of global trade but also for the security of international commerce.

On the other hand, Israel frames its recognition of Somaliland as a continuation of the Abraham Accords. These normalization agreements, signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, had significantly lost their momentum following the Gaza genocide. As a result, negotiations with other Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia, were suspended.

Despite this, efforts by the United States President Donald Trump, who seeks to maintain the Abraham Accords politically and gain diplomatic and symbolic advantages through a mediator role, have continued. Indeed, although Kazakhstan already has bilateral relations with Israel, it was symbolically included in the Accords and became the most recent country to join them.

The recognition of Somaliland thus completes this strategy for Israel. For Israel, this move represents an attempt to revive the stalled normalization process under the Abraham Accords by expanding it through actors with contested international status. The Somaliland initiative aims to send a message that the Accords remain viable despite the genocide, while also rebuilding diplomacy through alternative channels.

Although Israel is the first country to officially recognize Somaliland, the Somaliland administration already maintains deep economic and logistical ties with the United Arab Emirates. In addition to the UAE’s military base in Berbera, its investments in the port enable Somaliland to be effectively integrated into a Gulf-centered economic architecture. These links also offer Israel the potential to deepen its normalization with Gulf actors through Somaliland.

In recent times, Somaliland has also signed major investment and infrastructure agreements with Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s longstanding challenge of access to the sea makes Somaliland’s ports strategically attractive. However, the planned port project in Somaliland has deepened tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. This crisis was eased through talks mediated by Turkey, leading both Ethiopia and Somalia to take steps to reduce tensions.

In this context, Turkey’s comprehensive support for the Somali government and Israel’s growing relations with the Somaliland administration have the potential to reshape regional power balances. The presence of Turkey and Israel in the region signals the possible emergence of a new arena of competition in Somalia, similar to the rivalry currently observed between the two countries in Syria.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland also sets a potential precedent for similar secessionist movements across Africa. In the Horn of Africa, where state-building remains fragile, such recognition risks deepening existing ethnic, political, and historical fault lines. The possibility that other secessionist actors may cite this precedent as a model has become a major source of concern among regional states.

Amid all these developments, one of the most controversial aspects of Israel’s engagement with Somaliland lies in its plans concerning Gaza. In recent months, Somaliland has been prominently mentioned as a potential destination for the forced transfer of Palestinians from Gaza. In this context, the recognition of Somaliland is also part of Israel’s broader search for a “permanent solution” to the Palestinian issue.

The U.S. dimension further elevates this debate to a global level. Donald Trump recently drew attention with harsh and derogatory remarks about Somalis and Somali immigrants. During Trump’s administration, Somalis faced a comprehensive travel ban. Trump’s rhetoric and policies are essential to understanding the background of the American stance on Somaliland.

Republican Senator Ted Cruz has strongly advocated for deepening ties between Somaliland and Israel and for U.S. recognition of Somaliland. Cruz frequently argues that the United States has been too slow on this issue and that Somaliland’s strategic importance can no longer be ignored. Trump, however, has so far signaled that no such step will be taken, asking, “Does anyone even know what Somaliland is?”

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland emerges as a multilayered development that cannot be explained under a single heading. On one hand, this move reflects how the competition for influence and spheres of interest between Israel and Turkey, increasingly visible in other regions, has now extended to the Horn of Africa. On the other, it renews global attention on the security of trade networks along the Red Sea–Aden Gulf corridor.

At the same time, considering the already fragile state structures and contested borders across Africa, such recognition decisions may produce long-term and destabilizing consequences. Moreover, this move once again demonstrates that Israel views the Palestinian issue as a problem that can be relocated and restructured across different geographies.

Since World War II, Japan and Germany have been viewed internationally as symbols of military restraint. Japan, bound by its pacifist constitutional clause, and Germany, burdened by its historical legacy, deliberately relegated military power to the background. Economic strength, diplomacy, and multilateral institutions long served as the foundational pillars of security for both nations.

In recent years, however, this approach has undergone a marked transformation. Decisions on defense budgets from Tokyo and Berlin signal a fundamental shift in how security is conceptualized. Rising geopolitical uncertainties, pressure from the United States, and growing doubts about the capacity of international institutions to manage crises have pushed both countries to reconsider security through the lens of national military capability.

Japan’s newly approved budget of 122.3 trillion yen allocates over 9 trillion yen to defense spending. This record increase reflects not only quantitative growth but also qualitative transformation. Investments in missile systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and naval capacity demonstrate that Japan now defines its security not through reliance on the international system but through its own deterrence capabilities.

This budget increase is part of Japan’s five-year defense plan. The most striking feature of the plan is the goal to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP. For a country like Japan, which is not a NATO member, this target carries normative significance. Japan, currently the tenth-largest defense spender in the world, is projected to rise to third place globally after the United States and China once the plan is fully implemented.

This transformation inevitably renews debates over the constitution. The postwar Japanese Constitution, drafted under U.S. leadership, explicitly prohibited the use of force to resolve international disputes. However, in 2015, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a constitutional reinterpretation granted Japan the right to “collective self-defense” under specific conditions.

Today, however, this framework is deemed insufficient by new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Takaichi argues that Japan’s current security environment has surpassed the limits of this narrow interpretation and insists that constitutional provisions related to security must be amended. This approach signals Japan’s intent to permanently institutionalize its military transformation on legal grounds, effectively putting the principle of pacifism on hold.

The primary factor reshaping Japan’s security perception is China. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy identifies China as its most serious strategic threat. Recently, Chinese aircraft conducting radar lock-ons against Japanese air assets during drills off Japan’s southwest have further heightened already fragile tensions between the two countries.

China interprets Japan’s cooperation with the United States in space and defense technologies as part of a regional arms race. Another development reinforcing this perception is Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statement that the Japanese military could intervene if China were to launch a military operation against Taiwan. This remark has further deepened the already sensitive security dilemma between the two nations.

Meanwhile, Germany is also crossing a similar psychological threshold as Japan. Germany’s Bundestag Budget Committee approved a 52 billion euro military spending package aimed at ending decades of constrained defense financing. This step is a concrete manifestation of the “Zeitenwende” (turning point) process, named after former Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s landmark speech.

Another key element of this framework is NATO targets. Germany’s coalition government aims to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2029, in line with the new NATO target. How Germany’s welfare state and fiscal discipline model will balance this growing defense burden remains unclear. However, there is now a strong consensus in Germany that avoiding the cost of security is no longer feasible.

The United States plays an indispensable role in the rearmament of both Japan and Germany. Beyond Trump’s rhetoric, the recently published National Security Strategy explicitly demands greater burden-sharing from regional allies in response to China and Russia. In this context, the United States has assumed a role compelling its allies to assume greater responsibility.

The rapid rearmament steps taken by Japan and Germany convey more than isolated national narratives. Both countries are transitioning from long-standing exceptions of military restraint toward a new norm. It is clear that defense strategies are now deeply intertwined with constitutional frameworks, budgets, public opinion, and foreign policy identity. Japan and Germany appear to have concluded that military restraint is no longer a sustainable security strategy under current international conditions.

In Indonesia, the world’s largest holder of nickel reserves, the revelation that a private airfield in the Morowali region—home to major nickel facilities—has operated for years with minimal oversight has sparked widespread public outcry. The facility, which functions without the consistent presence of central state mechanisms such as customs and immigration controls, has become central to debates over state capacity and sovereignty.

Such a lack of oversight poses a serious security risk. A poorly monitored air infrastructure can create a broad gray zone encompassing illegal smuggling, illicit transfers of valuable minerals, and even the movement of unidentified individuals. Even if these risks have not yet materialized, their high likelihood raises serious questions about the state’s control capacity.

This debate becomes even more critical when considering Indonesia’s weight in the global nickel market. With approximately 55 million tons of nickel reserves, Indonesia ranks first globally, while its closest competitor, Australia, holds reserves of about 24 million tons. This clear advantage has made Indonesia an indispensable actor in global supply chains. Thus, any gap in critical hubs like Morowali becomes a matter of close international scrutiny regarding both security and market stability.

The industrial zone in Morowali is a key link in the global supply chain due to its critical nickel resources for electric vehicle batteries and heavy foreign investment. The strong presence of Chinese companies in the region is particularly notable. Given that approximately three-quarters of Indonesia’s nickel refining capacity is under Chinese control, new debates have emerged regarding economic gains versus dependency relationships.

The presence of Chinese companies in Morowali is also controversial in terms of environmental impacts. Local communities have long voiced complaints about pollution, damage to fisheries, and industrial accidents. Considering that environmental standards are easily compromised in areas with weak oversight, economic development based on nickel mining confronts serious local environmental and social justice challenges.

In conclusion, the airfield in Morowali has exposed the vulnerabilities in Indonesia’s nickel strategy. Yet this incident can also be viewed as a threshold moment. If properly managed, it could offer a lesson that development and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive but can only be sustained together. How Indonesia, as an emerging actor with vast nickel resources, chooses to navigate its path under established rules will be one of the fundamental factors determining the country’s economic and strategic future in the coming period.